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I. INTRODUCTION
"We will gather there and they will have to build the dam on top of us."1
1. Chrispin Inambao, Epupa Gets Green Light, Nujoma Slams 'Sinister Manipulators', NAMIBIAN Aug. 19,
1997, at 1 (quoting Chief Hikuminue Kapika in a BBC interview).
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"Change and trade will follow the overhead power lines from the power plants
along the Kunene, new possibilities will open up for agriculture and stock
keeping, and even humans and their polities will adapt.",
2
In a world with no shortage of sharply focused legal disputes that challenge the
capacity of law to achieve both justice and meaningful social change, one of the
more graphic disputes is the struggle of the OvaHimba (hereinafter "Himba") 3, a
pastoral tribe of about 25,000, against the proposed Epupa Dam on the Kunene
River. The river forms the border between Namibia and Angola in a remote
comer of Africa without access to either electricity or gas stations.4 This US$ 600
million dam (before cost overruns), at almost 600 feet high, the highest in
Africa5, would hold a flooded impoundment6 of up to 380 square kilometers,
forty to sixty miles long. It would permanently alter a unique desert ecosystem,
flood the spectacular Epupa Falls, and force the relocation of many of the Himba,
disrupting their traditional way of life.7
Thirty or forty years ago, this might have been a familiar story of development
at the expense of indigenous peoples, but the twenty-first century world is a
different place. While the Himbas' legal rights were ignored as recently as 1995,
those rights now have a more distinct stature because of the newly-accepted
"discourse of development," and have emerged as an issue potentially either
2. NEW NoTEs ON KAoKo: THE NORTHERN KUNENE REGION 240 (John T. Friedman et al. eds., 2000) (quoting
H.W. Stengel, SWAVEK water engineer, 1966) (hereinafter NEW NOTES ON KAOKO).
3. The proper term is "ovaHimba" which, in the Herero language, means "Himba people." Outside of the
Hereto language, the people are ordinarily referred to simply as "Himba," a usage followed here.
4. See generally John T. Friedman et al., Mapping the Epupa Debate: Discourse and Representation in a
Namibian Development Project, in THE NORTHERN KUNENE REGION (2000); Carol Ezzell, The Himba and the
Dam, Sci. Am. June 2001, available at http://www.sciam.com/2001/0601issue/0601ezzell.html#author (last
visited Aug. 10, 2001).
5. The exact height of the proposed Epupa Dam depends upon which location is the final site: the Baynes site
would require a higher dam (200 meters) than the Epupa site (163 meters). By way of comparison, the Hoover
Dam, on the Colorado River, is just over 700 feet high. In Africa, the Aswan Dam, damming the Nile River in
Egypt, is I 11 meters high; the Cahora Bassa Dam, on the Zambezi River in Mozambique is 171 meters high;
downstream from the Kariba Dam, 128 meters high. Lower Cunene Hydropower Scheme Feasibility Study,
Draft Feasibility Report, v. 1, chapter 5.1.2 (on file with author) [hereinafter Draft Feasibility Report].
6. In the business of dam building, as in law, language is everything. Dam builders prefer to call the water
reservoir behind a dam a "lake," because a "lake" offers images of beauty, recreational opportunities, and
enhanced real estate values, all of which offset the "costs" of flooding vast areas of land. This language is used
to refer to the "lake" at Epupa Dam as well. But the "impoundment" behind the Epupa dam would be a vast mud
flat up to sixty miles long and five miles wide much of the year as the water level drops hundreds of feet during
the dry season. Then, in optimum conditions, the rainy season from November to April in the Angola highlands
would cause the reservoir to fill sufficiently, so that it could hold enough water to enable the dam to make power
during the May through October dry season. Thus, it might be hoped that the reservoir might be full for a few
months after April, providing for recreational opportunities. Resorts, built on the high water line, would be two
to four miles away from the water by November and across a broad and uninhabitable mud flat. In drought
years, which regularly occur, the reservoir might completely dry up, down to the original river bed, and stay that
way for several seasons. This does not describe a "lake."
7. See Steve Rothert, Good Energy, Bad Economics May Kill Epupa Dam, WORLD RIvERs REv. 13 (Apr.
1998).
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blocking the construction of the dam or, perhaps more likely, significantly raising
its cost to the level where the dam is not economically feasible, therefore killing
the project. Although no major court case arguing "indigenous land rights" has
apparently ever succeeded on the African continent, for reasons having to do with
the legacy of colonialism, relatively conservative and political judiciaries who
are unwilling to make rulings against the state, unique legal and political
problems of rural land development, and the danger of "tribalism" in what have
proved to be very fragile nation-states, indigenous peoples now have significantly
more legal rights.8
This study will set out the legal framework of the Himbas' resistance to the
Epupa Dam. It begins with the Himba story, a simple history of their existence in
northwestern Namibia and southeastern Angola over at least the past four
hundred years. The next section describes the Epupa Dam scheme as a legacy of
German colonialism, inherited by the British, the South Africans, and finally the
government of an independent Namibia. The third section addresses the imposi-
tion of the dam in the midst of Himba society; the unsettling specter of Swedish
and Norwegian engineers, marching through Himba lands in expensive safari
garb from a picturesque tented compound tended by servants, yet completely
unaware of the Himba. This gave rise to an angry conflict between the Himba,
backed by much of the world environmental community, on one side, and the
Namibian government and domestic proponents of the dam on the other,
mediated by both law and the language of law. The government of Namibia, the
indirect employer of the engineers, has pursued a clear policy, advocating a
model of "development" at the expense of the rights of individual tribes, arguing
not only that the Himba must yield to the greater good, but that the Himba,
themselves, have a "right to development" that the government has a duty under
the Namibian Constitution to provide all its citizens. 9 Next, the Himba's land
rights will be discussed in the context of their other human rights. Finally, this
article will examine aboriginal title and the rights of indigenous peoples dis-
placed by dam construction as possible sources of customary international law.
8. It is inevitable in modem Africa that issues of indigenous land title will reach various African courts over
the coming years. One, from the Richtersveld, a region just over the southern border of Namibia, is presently
proceeding in the South African courts. See Barry Streek, Richtersveld People's Land Quest Foiled, MAIL AND
GuARDIAN, Mar. 23, 2001; Marianne Merten, Namas Make History in Land Claims Court, MAIL AND GuARDIAN,
Sept. 27, 2000. The first round was lost in the Land Claims Court in March 2001, but appeals are continuing.
Other cases are also being framed in Botswana and Namibia.
9. Wemer Menges, Epupa Dam is Himba's Right, NAMIBIAN, July 30, 2001. Deputy Minister of Justice
Albert Kawana states: "[t]he Government is determined to live within the letter and spirit of the Namibian
Constitution, namely, to take economic development to all our communities, including the OvaHimba .... The
OvaHimba, like every Namibian community, have a right to economic development. The development level of
an African state is largely determined by the level of development of all communities within it, not just a few of
them. Therefore, any well-meaning African government has the duty to ensure that development projects are
evenly spread throughout the country so as to ensure that other communities are not left behind, for the sake of
nation building." Id.
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Although the law regarding indigenous land rights is unsettled, it is clear that an
assertion of these rights alone cannot resolve the issue or protect the future of the
Himba within the broader context of Namibian and African development. Himba
land rights must be recognized in a context that supports and protects their culture
within the modem Namibian state. Existing Namibian law does not provide a
legal framework within which this can occur.
IH. HISTORY OF THE OVAHIMBA IN ANGOLA AND NAMIBIA
A. THE HIMBA
The OvaHimba are a distinct people because they are visually striking. Their
bodies-tall, mostly naked, bejeweled, covered hair to foot with a red ochre and
butter paste-are immediately recognizable. They have been featured worldwide
in commercials for such brand names as Volkswagen and Samsonite.' ° Their
land, called "Kaokoland" in Namibia, is an isolated, mountainous high desert,
straddling the border between Namibia and Angola. It is inland on an escarpment
above the Atlantic Ocean. Kaokoland is a "wilderness" inhabited by free roaming
desert elephants and other exotic game species; a corner of the "real" Africa,
relatively isolated, but accessible by anyone with a credit card."'
Little is known about the Himba on the Angolan side of the border, because
Angola has been involved in a protracted civil war since 1975 that has disrupted
every aspect of governmental administration. The Angolan Himba are immediate
relatives of the Namibian Himba and the border, although officially "closed," is
de facto open for the Himba who regularly cross for visits and ceremonial
occasions, and for the extended families who own herds on both sides of the
border. 12 There may be 15,000 Himba in Namibia, probably a smaller number in
10. The Red People of the Desert, 3 AFRICA: ENVIRONMENT AND WILDLIFE 76-81 (1995) ("Volkswagen of
South Africa's popular Microbus has been rejuvenated. Over and above improvements to its appearance,
VWSA engineers have also endowed the five-cylinder engine with more cubic centimeters and more torque at
low revs. We put the newcomer to the test in the north of Namibia."). The advertising feature began with a
striking photo of a Himba woman, naked above the waist, in front of two VW vans. The Samsonite
advertisements, run on American television in 1998, featured a Samsonite suitcase dropping from the sky into a
Himba village. The Himba gathered around the bag, trying to open it. The suitcase survived both the fall and the
Himba.
11. See generally J. DU P. BOTHA ET AL., KAOKOVELD: THE LAST WILDERNESS (1988). Although the origin of
the term is unclear, it may derive from Okaoko, the Herero word for the left, or south, bank of the Kunene River.
The term "wilderness" is itself political, representing cultural images of wild, virgin lands in the path of a large
dam. The Himba graze their remote lands with thousands of cattle, so it is, in fact, not a wilderness, as beautiful
and remote as it is.
12. While the Angolan Civil War has not been fought in the general area of Epupa since the withdrawal of
South African forces by 1990, the impact of the continuing war in other parts of the country has been to spread
Angolan governmental resources so thinly that there is no local administration in the Epupa area. This was also
true of Namibia as recently as 1996: there were no local government officials, and no border posts, so the border
could easily be crossed by fording the Kunene River in several traditional crossing places. Namibia put a small
police post at Epupa in 1996. The Angolan side is reportedly still mined in some places, also a remnant of the war.
2001]
THE GEORGETOWN INT'L ENVTL. LAW REVIEW
Angola. 13
The Himba's visual distinctiveness is deliberate. Over the past hundred years
the nearby peoples, like most Africans, have largely adjusted their dress in
response to missionary and colonial demands. The Himba did not, remaining
dressed in leather aprons, naked above the waist. This is not, entirely, an
indication of their "isolation"; rather, it reflects a prosperous pastoral people with
a strong will to continue their lives. South African labor contractors, sent into
Kaokoland in the early 1950s, reported that they could not induce the Himba to
sign labor contracts because they were so content with their pastoral lives. 14 Half
of the few Himba who did sign such contracts immediately deserted when they
found the work not to their liking. 15
B. THE EMERGENCE OF THE HIMBA AS A DISTINCT PEOPLE
Formerly an official "native reserve," Kaokoland is now part of the expanded
Kunene Region. The Region is part of a deliberate government plan to reduce the
influence of the Himba and their Herero relatives in regional politics by including
a large number of neighboring Damara in the region. 16 Besides the Namibian
Herero, the Himba are also related to the Zemba, Tyavikwa, Hakavona, Kuvale,
Kwanyoka and Ngendelengo, all Herero peoples living in neighboring Southwest
Angola.' 7 The exact origins of these Bantu-speaking Herero peoples is unclear,
but they probably migrated south from central Angola at least four hundred years
ago. The emergence of the Himba as a distinct people probably occurred between
eighty and one hundred fifty years ago. 18
13. Draft Feasibility Report, supra note 5, at vol. 6B, ch. 10, p. 5. The most recent census of Namibia,
1993-94, sets the entire 1991 population of Kaokoland at 26,176 with Herero making up 60% and the Himba
and smaller groups making up 40%, about 12,000 people at that time, rising to about 16,000 in 2000. While
Denmark's International Working Group for Indigenous Affairs estimates there are about 35,000 Himba (in both
countries), this estimate is higher than the Namibian data would support. Moses Maurihungirire, Epupa May
Need Tradeoffs, NAMIBIAN, Oct. 3, 1997. Assuming an equal population in Angola, there would be at most
32,000 Himba in 2000. It must be added here that the rural population growth rate in Kaokoland is 5.65%,
among the highest rates in the world. Draft Feasibility Report, supra note 5, at vol. 6B, ch. 10, p.5. It is
significant that, given the extensive study of the region for dam planning purposes, there are no accurate
population statistics on the Himba, the people who live where the dam is to be built. There is some concern that
there is a deliberate under-counting for political reasons, although this cannot be proved. For the purposes of this
work, I use 25,000 as a reasonable figure; it is still a small tribe standing in the way of a large dam in a nation of
1,700,000.
14. Michael Bollig, The Colonial Encapsulation of the North-Western Namibian Pastoral Economy, 68
AFRICA 506, 523-24 (Apr. 1998) (hereinafter Bollig, Colonial Encapsulation).
15. Id. at 524.
16. Kaokoland, itself, has a unique history and culture, inseparable from that of the Himba. See generally
BOTHA, supra note 11; NEW NOTES ON KAOKO, supra note 2.
17. See CARLOS ESTERMANN, THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF SOuTHWESTERN ANGOLA, vol. 3 (1981).
18. See J.S. MALAN, PEOPLES OF NAMmIA 85-101 (1995); MARGARET JACOBSOHN, HIMBA: NOMADS OF
NAMIBIA (1990); LouIs FOURIE Er AL., THE NATIVE TRIBES OF SoUTH WEST AFRICA 155-208 (1928). These
accounts are based on oral history: no written records record this history.
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About 1750, the Herero moved from Kaokoland to the south east in search of
more and better grazing land, occupying much of what is central Namibia.' 9 They
bore the brunt of German colonial oppression through the Herero War. A war of
extermination was waged against them in 1904-05, killing an estimated 50-80%
of the Herero. 20 The Nama, who live to the south and west of the Herero also
went to war against the Germans in 1904-07, but had fewer casualties: of 20,000
alive in 1904, only 9,781 remained in 1911. 2 A few Herero returned to southern
Kaokoland after the war, living near Himba peoples that they had been cut off
from for some years.22
For unknown reasons, the Himba separated from the Herero, and remained
behind in Kaokoland, largely unaffected by these colonial wars. Their occupation
of Kaokoland is continuous for perhaps four hundred years, except for some
dislocation caused by raiding Swartbooi and Topnaar Nama in the mid- to late-
nineteenth century. Dispersed herds could not easily be protected from such raids
because the cattle were easily stolen and their herdsmen easily killed. As a result,
many of the herds were removed for a few years to the Angolan side of the
Kunene River, beyond the reach of the raiders. 23 Modern Himba identity - as a
people distinct from the Herero-dates from this period, although their history of
land occupation in Kaokoland goes back further. The Himba are those Herero
who fled to Angola with their herds; the Tjimba are those Herero who lost their
cattle.24 For a period in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the
Himba effectively played German and Portuguese colonial masters against each
other; neither colonial power had effective control of the remote region. By the
turn of the century, however, Portuguese colonial power pressed Himba lands
from the north, causing them to move south to Namibia.25
C. THE GERMAN ARRIVAL IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA
Although the Germans arrived in 1885 and occupied South West Africa, they
never exercised any political or legal authority north of the "police line" (also
called the "red line" because of the color representing it on colonial maps and still
existing today as the "cattle line" because native cattle may not be moved across
it), including in Kaokoland.26 The Germans drew this "police line," extending
19. FOURiE, supra note 18, at 156-57.
20. See JON M. BRIDGMAN, THE REVOLT OF THE HEREROS 164 (1981); see also JAN BART GEWALD, HERERO
HEROES: A SOCIO-POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE HERERO OF NAMIBIA: 1890-1923 (1999).
21. BRIOGMAN, supra note 20, at 165.
22. GEWALD, supra note 20, at 207-08.
23. See MALAN, supra note 18, at 88.
24. See PATRICIA HAYES ET AL., NAMIBIA UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN RULE: MOBILITY AND CONTAINMENT,
1915-1946 (1998).
25. See id. See also WOLFRAM HARTMAN ET AL., THE COLONISING CAMERA: PHOTOGRAPHS IN THE MAKING OF
NAMIBIAN HISTORY (1998); Bollig, Colonial Encapsulation, supra note 14.
26. See HELMUT BLEY, SOUTH-WEST AFRICA UNDER GERMAN RULE, 1894-1914 (1968).
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completely across northern Namibia to keep their colonists "inside" or south of
the line, where they could be protected by the German authorities and live under
German law. Conversely, the native people who lived "outside" or north of the
line were protected in their lands against the encroachment of colonists and were
not subject to German law. Keeping the two peoples apart was intended to
provide a peaceful frontier.27 The Germans generally did not disturb the Himba
except for a handful of exploring expeditions that passed through Kaokoland
during the thirty year German colonial period. These years produced great
prosperity, as the Himba traded both cattle and goods to neighbors on all sides,
making them independent, self sufficient, and rich in cattle.2 8 They existed as a
pastoral people, well adapted to their region.
D. PASTORAL CULTURE AND PROPERTY RIGHTS
Pastoral cultures are common in southern and central Africa.29 Africa's vast
savannas are expansive grasslands ideal for cattle raising. Distinct pastoral
cultures developed south of the Sahara Desert; from Niger and Mali to Somalia;
from Ethiopia and Kenya to South Africa. The Himba, similar to other Herero,
have a complex culture including a system of double descent, with each person
belonging to both matrilineal and patrilineal descent groups.30 While land is held
communally, different families and clans derive land rights from customary law
administered by chiefs and counselors. Herds are large, numbering up to five
hundred, and grazing on common lands in a semi-desert environment requires
careful allocation of grasslands.3 '
The Himba have definite rights to real property under their customary law.
At the basic level, each family "owns" the lands immediately around its
household complex. This includes the huts and fenced yards, gardens,
graveyards, and nearby pastures for the household animals. The actual
"owner" is ordinarily thought of as the senior male in the family, but he holds
the land on behalf of his family. These rights are respected by all, extending
far back in customary law. 32
27. This kind of strategy was not unique to German colonizers. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 was
designed to serve the same purpose in North America. That line, of course, was not "policed," so the experiment
failed. A central feature of German colonization, however, was its confidence in bureaucracy and in
administration and they made a great effort to "police" this line.
28. See HARTMAN, supra note 25.
29. See CUSTODIANS OF THE COMMONS: PASTORAL LAND TENURE IN EAST AND WEST AFRICA (Charles R. Lane
ed. 1998).
30. See MALAN, supra note 18, at 71-75; 89.
31. See HAYES, supra note 24.
32. Andrew Corbett, The Epupa Dam Question: Its Impact on the Local Himba Community and the Natural
Environment, 13-14, 25-26 (paper presented to the World Commission on Dams) (1998) (on file with author).
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E. GRAZING RIGHTS
1. Background
Grazing rights are held communally in very complex ways. Because many
Himba communities share vast grazing lands, each Himba community must
respect the respective communal grazing rights of the other communities. The
cattle of many families often must graze together. No herd may move ahead of
another, nor are the combined herds allowed to move over new grass, trampling
or spoiling it before it can be grazed. Grazing lands must be carefully used in
order to save the most reliable grass for the driest months. Some grazing land is
held in reserve for drought periods. Since cattle have great value, these grazing
rights are among the most valuable assets of a community; without the cattle, the
community will disappear. Groups of senior men allocate grazing rights, which
must be flexible in order to meet changing ecological considerations.
33
Although only up to 1000 Himba actually live in the area to be flooded by the
Epupa Dam, almost the entire tribe has at least some reserve grazing rights to
these lands because they contain the most reliable water and are therefore
reserved for the common usage of the community in a drought. It is impossible to
calculate the actual extent of potential grazing rights to these lands, or the cost of
replacement grazing lands because the grazing system has to be flexible enough
to respond to changing environmental conditions in a fragile desert landscape.
Cattle are primarily inherited through the matrilineal descent group, while
religious and political offices are inherited through the patrilineal group. This
system reinforces traditional family linkages, and increases social stability.
Decision-making is in the hands of chiefs, who work closely with counselors and
wealthy males.34 Under Namibian law, customary law is recognized to the extent
that it does not conflict with Namibian state law. These traditional authorities
therefore exercise political and legal authority over their communities. 35
There are currently fifteen Himba chiefs, each theoretically of equal rank and
responsible for a particular area occupied by a well-defined group of people with
traditionally defined grazing rights. Five to seven counselors, generally wealthy
older men, assist each chief. Relations with South Africa, which created many
33. Id.
34. Michael Bollig, Contested Places: Graves and Graveyards in Himba Culture, 92 ANTHROPOS 35, 37
(1997) (hereinafter Bollig, Contested Places).
35. See CONSTrTUTON OF NAMIBIA, Article 66, available at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/aw/waOOOOO-.html.
Traditional courts have extensive jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters. For example, a Himba traditional
court tried a rare murder case in 1999 in which a Himba was convicted of killing another Himba who had
previously assaulted him with a club. He was ordered to sell all his cattle and goats and sheep and pay of fine of
65 cattle. "A Himba man who loses his cattle becomes like a dog and where I was previously a man of substance
and status in Himba society, I have been reduced to nothing," plead the defendant, as he argued for leniency later
in a Namibian criminal court. The judge, taking account of this punishment, gave him an additional twelve year
prison sentence. Werner Menges, Justice Denied Ends in Double Tragedy, NAMIBIAN, July 16, 1999.
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additional chiefs, altered the original governance structure, with only three
chiefs. These new chiefs were incorporated into the administrative structure of
the native "reserves," a system of "indirect rule" in which the South African
government paid the chiefs and performed a number of judicial and political
functions.36 The Himba chiefs are still paid by the Namibian government, and
still perform legal and political duties as allocated under the Namibian constitu-
tion.37 These chiefs adjudicate any disputes about customary land or grazing
rights and their judgment is final, ordinarily not reviewable by Namibian courts,
giving the Himba substantial powers of local self government within the
Namibian state.
2. General Communal System of Grazing
The Himba live most of the year in permanent villages which are spread out
complexes of round wooden and mud huts, surrounded by fences and outbuild-
ings. They maintain a simple diet of sour goat milk and goat meat. More recently,
the Himba began adding to their diets by including meal and a few vegetables. In
addition, traditional home-brewed beer has also been augmented by cheap liquor.
Because the Himba economy requires little cash, it is seldom necessary to sell
cattle in order to get money; the primary value of the cattle is cultural,
representing power and wealth.
The proximity of graveyards underscores the permanence of these villages.
The graveyards are usually located within one or two kilometers of the villages
and are near a river bed. Each Himba picks the spot for her or his grave and this
site becomes a gathering place for extended clan relatives, who will come
together annually in ceremonial rites to commemorate their dead ancestor. These
gravesites are fundamental statements of identity, indicating where a person felt
the most comfortable, where they belonged.38
36. HAYES, supra note 24. "Indirect rule" was a feature of British colonial administration in Africa and Asia,
perhaps originating in India or Nigeria. While it took different forms in different colonies, essentially local
chiefs were kept in power, and continued making most local political and legal decisions, "advised" by a British
resident. The advantage of this system was that it was both cheap and stable: one resident and a small staff might
indirectly "rule" a colony of thousands or even hundreds of thousands. See generally LORD WILLIAM M. HAILEY,
NATIVE ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT IN BRITISH TROPICAL AFRICA 204 (1942). RUPERT
EMERSON, MALAYSIA (1979) provides one study of how the policy operated. "Indirect rule" was often a fiction,
as British authorities, through the local chiefs, took complete administrative power but, for political reasons,
concealing this behind the faqade of the rule of local chiefs. SALLY FALK MOORE, SOCIAL FACTS AND
FABRICATIONS: CUSTOMARY LAW ON KILIMANJARO, 1880-1980, 139 (1986). Obviously, this is not far from the
model of the South African and South West African "homelands" which were derived from the same colonial
policy.
37. See MICHAEL BOLLIG, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT AND PASTORAL PRODUCTION IN THE EPUPA PROJECT AREA
53 (1996) (hereinafter BOLLIG, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT).
38. Bollig, Contested Places, supra note 34. The feasibility study archeologist counted 160 grave sites and
95 cultural sites in the area to be flooded. Werner Menges, Epupa Decision to be Made Next Year, NAMIBIAN,
Dec. 7, 1998, at 1.
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Most of the people do not migrate with the herds, hence the Himba are not"nomads." Even the term "semi-nomadic" can be misleading; some Himbas
move quite regularly, while others do not. Because the cattle are dependent on
good grass that, in an arid environment is dependent on good water, they must
often move. The herds, because they require extensive grazing lands, are
dispersed in remote "cattle-posts," tended by young, unmarried males, ranging
between twelve and twenty-five years old. These posts move regularly, but
always within traditional grazing areas. A few Himba have as many as five
hundred cattle, with the average family probably having about one hundred, all
kept by young men in a number of cattle posts. A 1972 survey reported that
Kaokoland held 160,000 cattle, perhaps half owned by the Himba. 39 There may
be fewer cattle at present, but one estimate puts up to 33,000 Himba cattle on the
Namibian side within the general range of the proposed dam.4 0 This is great
wealth by African (or even American) standards; they are a prosperous people,
living a privileged life-style.
But this cattle wealth is held in a region without electricity, and most Himba
children never attend school. 4' A chief who owns five hundred cattle sleeps on the
floor of a mud hut. The whole Kaokoland Region-larger than some of the
smaller American states-has two gasoline stations and one mile of paved road
for the main street in Opuwo. Transportation is ordinarily by walking, or hitching
a ride. An owner who wishes to communicate with one of his cattle posts, perhaps
fifty miles distant, will ordinarily send a boy carrying an oral message. The boy,
upon getting his instructions, will immediately begin walking toward his destina-
tion, without preparation, and without carrying eithei- food or water. He can
expect to be fed by each village or cattle post he passes, representing a complex
traditional system of social obligation.
Himba herds are in excellent condition and the Himba are not "traditional" in
their sense of the market or of modern politics. They are careful breeders, and
always interested in new and better stock, as well as better markets for their
cattle. Even if cattle are seldom sold, it still matters that when they are sold, they
are sold at a good price. Government veterinarians pass through occasionally to
vaccinate the herds against disease. Cattle, when they are sold for cash income,
are ordinarily sold to Ovambo traders to feed the booming population of
neighboring Ovambo regions. A veterinary fence, the "red line," divides Namibia
and keeps most black-owned cattle from the markets of southern Namibia, South
Africa, and Europe, a sore point to the Himba as well as all others who raise cattle
39. JACOBSOHN, supra note 18, at 16. This may not be the number of cattle now held; a drought killed many
cattle in the early 1980s, but herds have substantially recovered.
40. See BOLLIG, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, supra note 37, at 15.
41. Basic education is widely available in Namibia, reaching almost all villages and almost all children. The
Himba are the major tribe in the country not to educate their children in government schools. They fear, perhaps
justifiably, a loss of their culture.
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in the north.42 This perpetuates the former colonial structure, and reduces the
value of black-owned cattle.
3. The Himba and Early Colonial Administrators
While the Himba appear by their dress and life-style to be "primitive," they
have worked shrewdly and effectively with various levels of colonial administra-
tors-such as the Portuguese, Germans, British, and South Africans, for well over
a hundred years. Most recently, they have survived two wars, including both the
South African war with Cuba and Angola, and the Angolan Civil War.
During South African rule, effectively beginning some time in the early 1920s,
it was obvious that South Africa intended to assert control over the Himba and
Kaokoland, abandoning the German policy of leaving the people north of the"police line" alone. The land and people north of the "line" were to be
incorporated into the South African economy, serving as both a labor reserve, and
a "quarantine zone," keeping the majority black population isolated from the
white farming areas south of the "line."43
In 1921 South Africa put a "native commissioner" in Ovamboland, the densely
populated area immediately to the east of Kaokoland, and closed the border
between Kaokoland and Ovamboland to the Himba cattle trade. The Ovambo,
now the dominant people of Namibia, composing about 60% of the population,
had a long history of trade with the Himba. 44 The first native commissioner,
Cocky Hahn, was also given jurisdiction over Kaokoland. His job was to apply
the British model of "indirect rule" by administering these regions through the
local chiefs.
The South Africans also tried, for the first time, to control the border with
Angola by forbidding Angolan traders in Kaokoland and Ovamboland and by
attempting to stop the Himba and their cattle from freely crossing the border.
While the three hundred mile border between Kaokoland and Angola remained
porous in spite of these efforts, the closing was partially successful, especially
with regard to moving cattle.45 The impact of closing these borders was
devastating to the Himba because most of their traditional trade routes were
therefore no longer available. South Africa's intent was to isolate Kaokoland and
destroy the Himba pastoral economy in order to force them into signing migrant
labor contracts and going off to work in South Africa's mines.4 6 Kaokoland,
42. Physically, this is a well-maintained six foot wire fence, with shorter fences supporting it on either or
both sides. On major roads, a check-post is still maintained, manned by officials. Cars are routinely waved
through, often not even stopping.
43. RUTH FIRST, SOUTH WEST AFRICA 121-28 (1963).
44. Patricia Hayes, Cocky Hahn and the "Black Venus": The Making of a Native Commissioner in South
West Africa, 1915-1946, in GENDER AND HISTORY (1996).
45. See Bollig, Colonial Encapsulation, supra note 14, at 518-19.
46. See id at 518-26.
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itself, was already emerging as a game hunter's paradise: the South Africans
severely punished traditional hunters in order to protect the game for them-
selves.47 Cattle herds were also inconsistent with large populations of wild game
because they competed for scarce grasses.
The Himba herds were an economic threat to South African interests and a
medical threat as well. Despite the veterinary fence, the fear of cattle disease
brought South African veterinary practices to Kaokoland. Himba cattle have been
vaccinated since the 1920s. The herds grew rapidly because the Himba kept cattle
for social and political as well as economic reasons. The Himba cattle economy
was, at its core, so frugal and efficient that it could expand even when their trade
outlets were curtailed. This meant that most Himba young men did not go off to
the mines, because they could be productively, if not profitably, employed in
cattle herding. As the young herders reach marriageable age, they visit senior
relatives and ask to "borrow" cattle, to begin their herds. Thus, they continue to
manage herds that are a mixture of their own and their relatives' cattle, with the
proportion they own rising every year, making each richer and more engaged in
the traditionally based culture every year."8 South African officials recognized
what was happening, but the costs of labor recruitment among the Himba were
prohibitive. Labor recruitment, only begun in 1948, was curtailed in the early
1950s. 49
4. The Odendall Commission and South African Political Divisions
The Himba were left in Kaokoland with their herds, escaping the demeaning
experience of forced labor, and the forced separation of families. When the
Odendall Commission in the 1960s divided Namibia into apartheid era "home-
lands," creating the legal fiction of a white South West Africa, Kaokoland was
redesignated a "homeland" but remained isolated within its former "reserve"
borders. The Himba were left to an isolated existence compared to some of the
other peoples of Namibia.50 The small population of Kaokoland-perhaps 9,234
in 1964, about half of them Himba-left very low population densities, making
even the costs of indirect administration high.' Opuwo, the capital of Kunene
Region and the only town of any size in Kaokoland became an administrative
center in the 1950s, at the time an airstrip was constructed there in order to refuel
47. See id.
48. See id.at 523-24.
49. FRIEDMAN, supra note 2, at 195.
50. The Odendall Commission investigated native affairs in Namibia and made extensive recommendations
to divide Namibia into South African style "homelands," removing black people from the South West African
polity. The country was then politically reorganized to follow these recommendations. See SoUTH AFRICA,
REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF ENQUIRY INTO SOUTH WEST AFRICAN AFFAIRS (1964) (on file with author);
A.J. CHRISTOPHER, THE ATLAS OF APARTHEID 182-84 (1994); Namibia's experience with "homelands" is
analyzed in REGINALD GREEN ET AL., NAMIBIA: THE LAST COLONY 87-111 (1981).
51. Bollig, Colonial Encapsulation, supra note 14, at 528.
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airplanes flying from South Africa to Angola.52
In the 1970s and 1980s South Africa built three army bases in Kaokoland
during the war for independence. Himba herds were drawn back from the border
and the Himba were forced to remove to fortified villages surrounded by barbed
wired, under army watchtowers. Still they tended their herds, although these
were not prosperous times. Although there was little fighting in Kaokoland, the
Himba remember being assaulted by South Africans for protecting South West
Africa Peoples' Organization (SWAPO) fighters, but then being assaulted by
SWAPO for living under the protection of the South African army. Traditional
rivalries with the Ovambo, an adherence to their pastoral life-style, and their
isolation from participation in the forced labor regime of the apartheid era, kept
the Himba from more actively joining SWAPO in the guerrilla war. The
ramifications of this disengagement from the war still have significant conse-
quences in the Himba's distance from the current SWAPO government. The
Kunene Region is one of two that returns a majority to the Democratic Turnhalle
Alliance (DTA) Party, the main opposition party, and relations between the
Himba and SWAPO are poor.54
This underscores political divisions within the Kunene Region. SWAPO is
active in the region, and the Epupa scheme is central to SWAPO plans to
dominate Kunene Region politics. A Kaoko Development League supports the
dam. Based in Opuwo, this group represents businessmen (primarily Ovambo)
and youth, allied in plans to "modernize" Kaokoland by bringing in roads, jobs,
new stores, and modem conveniences. Dam construction is key to all of these
objectives. Politically, the Development League challenges the Himba as repre-
sentatives of the "community" affected by the dam.55
G. THE MODERN HIMBA DICHOTOMY: TRADITIONAL LIFE VERSUS HISTORY OF
ACCOMMODATION TO DIFFERENT COLONIAL GOVERNMENTS
The foundation of the struggle between the Himba and the Namibian govern-
ment over the Epupa Dam is set in this history. The Himba have a long and deep
relationship with their land, amounting to at least eighty years of exclusive and
uninterrupted occupation, within the approximately four hundred years of steady
occupation marked by the ebb and flow of droughts and wars. While their herding
culture is semi-nomadic, the Himba themselves have a well-established relation-
ship to the land, recognized by their customary law. Their traditional govern-
ments, headed by chiefs, are still functioning, deciding day-to-day matters and
52. Opuwo had a population of just over 4,000 in 2000.
53. BOLLIG, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, supra note 37, at 9-10.
54. Weich Mupya, Political Parties and the Elite in Kaoko, in NEW NoTEs ON KAOKO, supra note 2, at
207-214.
55. John T. Friedman, Mapping the Epupa Debate: Discourse and Representation in a Namibian Develop-
ment Project, in NEW NoTEs ON KAOKO, supra note 2, at 220-35.
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adjudicating disputes. By the standards under which they live, the Himba are a
wealthy pastoral people, with herds averaging 100 per family and reaching at
least 500 for some wealthy families. Kaokoland is a high desert, requiring vast
expanses of land to support a pastoral economy. While physically isolated by
great distances and poor roads, the Himba enjoy a rich culture and a satisfying
life-style, including regular trade for such luxuries as cloth and liquor, financed
by a small cash economy from the sale of cattle and from tourism. 56
This prosperity, coupled with isolation and the bilineal family structure, has
created a remarkably cohesive social structure. Himba communities are well
ordered, with little (but some) evidence of social disintegration. The authority of
the chiefs and elders is respected. The sacred fires burn in each household, and
traditional religion is respected. The various chiefs, while independent and equal,
are in continuous contact with each other, producing the near-unanimous Himba
denunciation of the Epupa Dam and a common response to the government on
the issue.57
Development requires hard choices, however, based on culturally specific
norms. The Himba deliberately stay distinct from Namibian society. Their
children generally do not attend school, and they suffer a higher rate of death and
disease than most Namibians because of their isolation from hospitals and
medical care. There is some evidence of malnutrition in children, the result of a
monotonous diet that may even include some food shortages among poorer, more
remote groups. 58 And men, not women, inherit cattle and traditional grazing
rights.
But the tragedy of the AIDS epidemic illustrates their isolation in reverse:
while the Ovambo, who live adjacent to the Himba have one of the highest rates
of infection in Africa, AIDS is rare in Himba society.59 Because of their social
and cultural isolation, they are not having sexual relations with outsiders.
An introduction to the booming business of "eco-tourism" in Kaokoland may
bridge the two discussions, one describing the history and culture of the Himba as
a "traditional" African people, the other describing their opposition to the Epupa
Dam. The recent advent of tourism to Kaokoland has made the Himba and their
political cause well known around the world. Namibia's superior tourist infrastruc-
ture allows tourists to fly relatively cheaply into Windhoek, rent a vehicle at the
airport, stock up on food and "safari" equipment, buy a road-map, and simply
drive off to see the Himba. The tourists are additionally afforded the opportunity
to stop off on the way in game parks and spot desert elephants beside the road as
they pass through Damaraland, the desert area immediately south of Kaokoland.
56. BOLLIG, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, supra note 37.
57. Id. at 52-58, 82-93.
58. See Draft Feasibility Report, supra note 5, at vol. 5.
59. Id. at vol. 6, part A3, Environmental Assessment, Epupa Site, chapter 8, 21. The estimated rate of HIV
infection in the Kunene Region is 1.4%.
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Some Himba participate in this tourist trade, selling their photographs or
begging, and the.Himba operate a "tourist village" where various activities may
be viewed.
Disguising their hundred-year history of accommodation to several different
colonial governments, the "traditional" quality of Himba life is a selling point for
eco-tourists. The Himba are visually striking, and their lands are beautiful, vast,
open, and under populated. 60 The political ideal of "preserving" the Himba and
their culture is very appealing, and this high level of visibility distinguishes the
Himba struggle against the Epupa Dam from the parallel resistance of many other
tribal peoples of India, Malaysia, and North and South America.
'III. THE EPUPA DAM, THE KUNENE RIVER, AND NAMIBIAN DEVELOPMENT
A. MODERN DAM BUILDING
Just as the Himba assume a symbolic stature because of their representation as
a unique traditional African pastoral tribe through tourism and the media, the
political context of the large hydroelectric dam project in the year 2000 is much
different than thirty years ago. The era of large dam building from the 1930s to
1960s produced thousands of such dams. Their effects can be readily seen and
studied-and there are serious questions being posed about the value of these
large dams, including calls for their "removal.' In November 2000, the World
Commission on Dams released a 600 page report highly critical of the world's
over-reliance on dams for water and electricity. The report highlighted additional
negative effects of dams on traditional peoples, and the high levels of waste and
corruption inherent in the dam building enterprise. It additionally advocated
careful reconsideration of the role of dams in modem hydroelectric develop-
ment.62
B. PLANS FOR DAMMING THE KUNENE RIVER
1. Water and Namibian Development
Water was, and is, a significant problem in planning for Namibian develop-
ment. The vast Namib Desert, along the coast, is the driest region in the world.
60. See Bennett Kangumu, Constructing Himba: The Tourist Gaze, in NEw NOTES ON KAOKO, supra note 2,
at 129-132; see also Eberhard Rothfuss, Ethnic Tourism in Kaoko: Expectations, Frustrations and Trends in a
Post-Colonial Business, in NEW NOTES ON KAOKO, supra note 2.
61. Discussion is already underway in the United States centering on the removal of the Glen Canyon Dam
on the Colorado River and a number of dams on the Snake River. For general information, visit the Glen Canyon
Institute's homepage at http://www.glencanyon.org/index.html and the website for the Save Our Wild Salmon
Coalition at http://www.wildsalmon.org (last visited Aug. 10, 2001).
62. World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making: The
Report of the World Commission on Dams (2000), available at http://www.dams.org (hereinafter Dams and
Development).
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Namibia is a country with little rainfall and long dry periods. There are only three
permanently flowing rivers adjoining the borders of the entire country: the
Orange on the South African border in the far south, and the Kunene and the
Kavango on the Angolan border in the far north. In between is twelve hundred
miles of farms and ranches, carved out of a semi-arid environment without
permanent natural surface water. The Germans and the South Africans who
followed constructed massive water supply schemes based on the Kunene River
as an obvious source of both water, and later, of hydroelectric power.6 3
The Kunene River rises in the mountains of central Angola, then flows south
for about five hundred miles before it turns west to become the border between
Angola and Namibia for its last two hundred miles.64 While it initially drains into
a well-watered and fertile valley, which is the heart of a densely populated
agricultural region in Angola, it later runs through progressively drier country,
reaching the Atlantic Ocean along the "Skeleton Coast" in the Namib Desert.65
The river, the only permanent surface water for miles, supports a unique
ecosystem.66
2. German Colonial Planning
The idea of damming the Kunene67 River for hydropower or water supply
purposes extends back to German colonial planning, the product of colonialism
and racism. 68 The Germans put engineering at the heart of their colonial
enterprise. Their thirty year occupation of South West Africa (1885-1915) was
characterized by the construction of railroads, roads, mines, water supply
systems, the drilling of thousands of wells, and the construction of hundreds of
63. See BRIGITTE LAU & CHRISTEL STERN, NAMIBIAN WATER RESOURCES AND THEIR MANAGEMENT: A
PRELIMINARY HISTORY (1996); see also H.W. STENGEL, WATER AFFAIRS IN SOUTH WEST AFRICA (1963).
64. Rob Simmons, Damming the Mighty Cunene, ROESSING 1-5 (Apr. 1993) (measures the length of the river
at 1050 kilometers, or just under 700 miles).
65. See C.T. Truebody, The Cunene River: A Valuable Natural Resource, in SWA YEARBOOK (1977) (on file
with author). The "Skeleton Coast" region has virtually no waterfall or permanent population. Id. at 24-29.
66. See generally BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY IN NAMIBIA: A COUNTRY STUDY (Phoebe Barnard ed., 1998).
67. The Portuguese spelling "Cunene" is often used in Namibia and is used in the Feasibility Study reports.
For consistency, I have used the English spelling, most commonly used in Namibia. I have not, however,
changed the spelling in direct quotations.
68. Renfrew Christie, Who Benefits By the Kunene Hydro-Electric Schemes, 2 SOCIAL DYNAMICS 2(1), 31-43
(1976). According to Christie, two German colonists, Brincker and Gessert first suggested damming the Kunene
about 1895, just about the time German explorers first viewed it. Damming a river for hydropower and water
supply purposes may be contradictory, however. Hydroelectric production requires a large reservoir of water
which, while held in "reserve" for hydro-power purposes, cannot be used, thus making the water unavailable for
other uses. In addition, while the water is impounded in a vast desert reservoir it evaporates at a high rate. Thus,
the business of making hydro-electricity in a desert wastes vast quantities of water in a sparse desert country.
The reverse is also true: using the water for agricultural purposes or human consumption makes it unavailable
for hydropower production. While some careful planning can reduce the level of waste, a high level of wasted
water is inevitable.
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small dams for water impoundment purposes.6 9
3. South African Colonial Authorities' Development of the River
a. Use of Falls and Rivers as Power Sources
The South African colonial authorities who succeeded the Germans also put
the development of the Kunene River high on their list of priorities. In the 1920s,
as the border between Namibia and Angola was delineated, the South Africans
insisted upon a right to use both the Ruacana Falls for power and the Kunene
River for water as a condition for recognizing an Angolan border about six miles
to the south of a disputed German colonial era border. This agreement divided
local Ovambo villages, cutting many black pastoralists and farmers off from
access to traditional watering points on the Kunene River, now on the Angolan
side of the boundary.7 °
b. Construction of Dams on the Kunene River
The South Africans acted on the idea of constructing dams on the Kunene
River in the 1960s. Taking advantage of the financial and political weakness of a
rival colonial power and the 1928 boundary treaty that reserved a right to
southwest Africa of water power from Ruacana Falls, the South Africans
negotiated new treaties with Portugal in 1964 and 1969 to build three dams on the
Kunene in Angola primarily for the benefit of Namibia. This remains a source of
discord in Angola toward further Namibian development of the Kunene River.
Although almost all the drainage and the distance of the Kunene is entirely within
Angola, most of the benefit of the river's water and power is realized by Namibia,
even though Namibia legally is entitled to no more than half of the water. Almost
all the water, in turn, comes from Angola, so even the "legal" fifty-fifty division
raises issues of equity.
Within Namibia, the primary beneficiaries of Ruacana power have been the
mining and farming industries, but the Kunene also provides water to almost all
69. LAU, supra note 63.
70. Randolf Vigne, The Moveable Frontier: The Namibia-Angola Boundary Demarcation, 1926-28, in
NAMIBIA UNDER SOUTH AFRICAN RULE: MOBILITY AND CONTAINMENT 1915-1946 (Patricia Hayes et al. eds.,
1988). To the British and South Africans, good relations with their ally, Portugal, were more important than the
territorial integrity of the Ovambo. Similarly, access to the Ruacana Falls for electrical power purposes for
mining development was more important than protecting the agricultural needs of the local black population.
The agreement itself, a Boundary Convention, was signed in Cape Town on June 22, 1926 and does not include
any reference to Kunene River water, although the meeting where the Convention was signed was called to
discuss both the boundary question and the water question. LAZARUS HANGULA, THE INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARY
OF NAMIBIA 40-43 (1993). Since the Ruacana Dam question and the Kunene water question were soon resolved,
it seems that these matters were orally agreed to at the time, a precondition for the settlement of the boundary
question in favor of Portugal: Portugal got the boundary it sought, but had to concede water rights to South
Africa. Id.
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of Ovamboland, and, consequently, to almost half of Namibia's population.7'
There was no consultation with the local black populations of either Angola or
Namibia when the apartheid-era Kunene hydropower scheme was constructed
and most blacks in the region still live without electric power.72 If the South
Africans and Portuguese were still in power the Epupa Dam might have been
built by the colonial powers by the 1970s, without any feasibility study.
The largest of these dams is at Ruacana Falls, entirely within Angola but just
across the Namibian border-and to this day remains guarded by Namibian
troops, just as it once was guarded by South African troops.73 The Ruacana Dam,
put in operation in 1981-83 produces about 50% of Namibia's electric power, but
its power output is highly variable and it has never been able to operate at its full
capacity of 240 megawatts ("MW") at any point since its construction.74 About
thirty miles above the Ruacana Dam further into Angola is the Calueque Dam.
This dam does some flood control and serves as an impoundment for the Ruacana
Dam, but its primary purpose is to provide water to irrigate Ovambo farms in
northern Namibia. A huge system of irrigation canals carries the water through
the former Ovamboland.75 Another dam at Matala also serves both flood control
and impoundment purposes.
The final dam, the Gove Dam, is much larger, is located near Huambo,
hundreds of miles further into Angola. It serves a critical function as an
impoundment at the base of the mountains where most of the water originates,
intended to regularize the flow of water at Ruacana in order to provide a steady
production of power.76 The Gove Dam, which also produces power for Angolan
use, was attacked and heavily damaged in the Angolan civil war. It still needs
71. Christie, supra note 68, at 31-35. The Calueque Dam diverts much Kunene water into the Cuvelai River,
which flows through Ovamboland before drying out at Ethosha Pan, a large salt flat.
72. Only 8 to 9% of rural households in Namibia currently have electricity. Namibia Ministry of Mines and
Energy, White Paper on Energy Policy Goals, May 1998, available at http://www.mme.gov.na/energy/
Default.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2001). Plans to electrify rural Namibia are still at an early stage. See generally
South African Development Community, available at http://www.eai.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/sadc.html; South
African Development Through Electricity (Pty) Ltd, (SADELEC), Study of Restructuring of the Namibian
Electricity Supply Industry, (Nov. 1999).
73. The dam is located in a "no man's land" surrounded by barbed wire, set apart from both countries. It is
the only place on the Namibian/Angolan border than one can legally simply walk into Angola. The procedure is
simple: approaching from Namibia, you ask the Namibian police personnel at the border if you can walk over to
see the dam and the falls. They ask you to leave them your passport, and you walk into Angola. No Angolans are
present in the dam area, nor can they get there without passing security. South Africa effectively seized control
of this small but valuable comer of Angola. In July 2001, when I last visited the area, the police on duty were
sleeping and an old woman opened the border gate and let me drive through to the observation area below the
dam. The opposite Angolan border post was unattended.
74. Robert Lundmark, Namibia's Energy Support Problem: The Epupa Scheme, (1997) (unpublished
Master's thesis, Economics Programme, Lulea University of Technology, Sweden) (on file with author).
Ruacana's production has been as high as 60% of Namibia's energy needs (1995), and as low as 45% (1994).
White Paper on Energy Policy Goals, supra note 72, at 10.
75. STENGEL, supra note 63, at 356-67.
76. Christie, supra note 68, at 31-33.
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millions of dollars worth of reconstruction, and can hold only about 40% of its
water capacity. Obviously, the reconstruction of the Gove Dam is very important
to Angola, as is social development along the Angolan stretches of the Kunene
River.
This current Kunene power scheme, complete as of the 1970s, built and
maintained by South Africa, is located entirely within Angola. Because the Gove
Dam is damaged and cannot hold a full volume of water, its ability to effectively
regulate the flow of water to the power station at Ruacana is reduced and
irregular, so the Ruacana Dam is producing power at some variable fraction of its
potential, generally about 50%.7 7 Since the Kunene is a desert river with a
seasonal flow, the Ruacana Dam requires large impoundments of water to
maintain steady power production but still loses its ability to make power in
drought years.7 8 Without these reservoirs, it could not make power at all during
the dry season, which lasts up to six months a year.
4. Proposed Epupa Dam
a. South African Plans for Construction
The proposed Epupa Dam is an extension of this already existing Kunene
power scheme, consisting of these four existing dams that have been partially
broken down for most of thirty years. The scheme, a marginal product of
apartheid-era colonial planning, begins with a desert river already burdened by
four dams. Of these dams, one is heavily war-damaged, and the largest is
currently producing only half of the electricity that it was built to produce. 79 But,
before South Africa withdrew from Namibia, it had the plan to construct another
dam at Epupa, over a hundred miles downstream from Ruacana, as an expansion
of the same scheme. The waste and inefficiency of this project can only be
justified by a colonial-era development mentality that power had to be guaranteed
to the Namibian mining and agricultural sectors at all costs.
b. Transfer of Plans to Namibia
The retreat of the South Africans from Namibia in 1990 left this plan completely
intact. The South West Africa Water and Electricity Company ("SWAWEK," an
77. Because the Ruacana Dam is only producing at 50% of its capacity, simply rebuilding and retrofitting the
Ruacana and Gove Dams and reservoirs with more modem hydropower technology, would produce more than
twice the power currently produced, with no relocation of local peoples and no further inundation of land, at a
fraction of the cost of the Epupa project. White Paper on Energy Policy Goals, supra note 72.
78. Christoff Maletsky, Ruacana Running Dry: Kunene Continues Dropping, Outlook Bleak, NAMIBIAN,
Sept. 4, 1995, at 1.
79. Ruacana's production has been as high as 60% of Namibia's energy needs (1995), and as low as 45%
(1994). White Paper on Energy Policy Goals, supra note 72, at 10.
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Afrikaans acronym), was a parastatal corporation and was completely taken over by
Namibia at independence and renamed in 1996 with the English acronym Nampower.
All property of the South African government became the property of the Namibian
government at independence, as SWAWEK was put under the Namibian Department
of Mines and Energy. SWAWEK announced that it was moving forward with the
Epupa project.80 The newly independent government embraced the project in the name
of "development" and nationalism; it would make Namibia independent of its reliance
on "foreign" (essentially South African) power, an important political consideration
under apartheid.81
Namibia is connected to a southern African power grid that can supply all of its
power needs. Ruacana Dam currently provides about 50% of Namibia's electric
power.82 Van Eck, a coal fired power plant in Windhoek, also provides electricity
in high demand periods, but is an especially expensive source of power because
the coal is imported.83 Because the Van Eyk power station consumes about 1000
tons of coal daily in normal use, it is kept in "reserve" mode and provides about
10% of Namibia's electrical power. About half of Namibia's electric power is
imported from South Africa at highly variable levels that fluctuate throughout the
year. Paratus, a diesel and gasoline generator at Walvis Bay, and Zambia, with a
line to Katima Mulilo, in the Caprivi Strip, provide very small amounts of
electricity. The Epupa Dam, by itself, with a capacity of 2000 to 2500 megawatts
(MW) would be capable of providing all of Namibia's power needs - assuming it
can function as planned.84
5. Preparations for Gaining Foreign Funding: the Feasibility Study
A "feasibility study" was initiated to provide some basis for cost estimates for
dam construction and as a required step in gaining foreign funding for the project.
The study, financed by Norway and Sweden at a cost of US$ 20 million, was done
by NAMANG, a consortium of Norwegian, Swedish, Namibian, and Angolan
companies. 85 An earlier "pre-feasibility study" had been completed in 1993,
80. See Lundmark, supra note 74, at 5.
81. Namibia became independent in 1990 and was actively moving the Epupa Dam project forward by 1992.
It is relevant to point out here that the South African government by the time of the Namibian decision to go
forward with the feasibility study for the Epupa Dam was the government of Nelson Mandela. Under the former
apartheid-era government, energy independence from South Africa might have been a more urgent matter,
involving concerns of national security that no longer exist, or are likely to in the future.
82. Lundmark, supra note 74, at 6.
83. Id.
84. Lundmark, supra note 74, at 7. Namibia's existing electrical capacity, for comparative purposes, is as
follows: Ruacana, 240 MW; Van Eck, 120 MW; Paratus, 24 MW; South Africa, 200 MW; Zambia, 2 MW,
totaling 588 MW, about one-fourth of the potential Epupa Dam generating capacity. Id.
85. NAMANG, an acronym for Namibia and Angola, is a company specifically formed to carry out the
feasibility study, was developed by Norconsult International (Norway); Swedpower (Sweden), Burmeister Van
Niekerk & Partners (Namibia), and SOAPRA (Angola).
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narrowing the potential area down to three possible sites. These sites needed
further study for dam planning purposes.86
The fifteen-volume "Lower Cunene Hydropower Scheme Feasibility Study,
Draft Feasibility Report" reported on research conducted from 1995-97 and was
intended to provide basic information primarily about engineering questions. It
was necessary both to show potential funding agencies reasonable cost estimates
and to demonstrate an adequate return to repay the loans.87 At a projected cost of
US$ 600 million the Epupa Dam would require one-fifth of the entire annual
Namibian budget, a huge debt far beyond the capacity of Namibia to finance by
itself.88 In addition, a range of social questions concerning large dam schemes
have emerged affecting some of the major western funding agencies. The World
Bank adopted new standards for funding large dam projects in the early 1990s
because of increasing concerns about both the damage done to relocated local
populations as well as huge debt burdens on third world countries. The United
States Embassy in Namibia cautioned against the Epupa scheme, seeing it as both
too expensive and too destructive of the environment. 89
The Governments of Norway and Sweden funded the feasibility study through
their respective foreign aid programs. Norway and Sweden have large hy-
dropower industries with no new domestic projects, under-employing a large
number of hydropower experts. 90 The $20 million (Namibian, about US $5
million at the time) in funding employed a large number of these engineers. This
funding was granted, apparently, with little thought about the social issues raised
by construction of the dam.
Although it seems unfathomable, work began in 1995 on the feasibility study
with little consultation with the Himba. The entire Epupa project'is on lands the
86. LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTRE, THE EPUPA DEBATE: A SUMMARY OF SOME OF THE KEY ISSUES AROUND THE
PROPOSED HYDROPOWER SCHEME ON THE LOWER CUNENE RIVER, Pamphlet, at 3 (hereinafter Legal Assistance
Centre Pamphlet). The Feasibility Study and its failure to deal with the rights of the Himba have embarrassed
Norway and Sweden, both with major world-wide involvement with human rights. The Pre-Feasibility Study
was small and limited to technical factors, and has been supplanted by the Feasibility Study. Norpower, in
association with SwedPower and Burmeister van Neikerk & Partners, Epupa Hydropower Scheme, Prefeasibil-
ity Study, Final Report, Feb. 1993. Updated Sept. 1993 (on file with author).
87. Draft Feasibility Report, supra note 5. The Study was originally posted on-line for easy public access,
but was removed after substantial opposition developed, focusing highly technical criticism on the poor quality
of some of the research. It is currently available in the Namibian National Archives, Windhoek and Nampower
headquarters, also in Windhoek.
88. Legal Assistance Centre Pamphlet, supra note 86. The cost estimates for a dam at the Baynes site is
US$ 551 million and US$ 539 million for a dam at the Epupa site (in 1998 dollars). These figures are
unrealistically low, including little, for example, for relocation costs.
89. Personal Communication. While there was no "official" United States position, the U.S. Embassy staff in
Windhoek was critical of the Epupa Dam scheme. The Embassy also promoted development of the Kudu gas
fields, in the Atlantic Ocean off Luderitz, as an alternative, giving rise to some cynical commentary about their
"promotion" of obvious American interests in oil and gas exploration and development. At the same time, the
U.S. Embassy views the Epupa Dam scheme as an internal Namibian matter.
90. FIVAS, POWER CONFLIcTS, ch. 13 (1996), available at http://www.solidariteitshuset.org (last visited Aug.
15, 2001).
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Himba use to graze cattle and are allocated to particular Himba herders through
traditional law, but the project built a large tented and luxurious "safari" style
camp beside the Kunene River, about a mile above the Epupa Falls. In a region
with dirt roads, and among a people who owned no vehicles, a dozen expensive
four-wheel drive trucks and a helicopter supported the study.9'
The Himba, although they formally granted permission to construct the camp,
resented this intrusion on their lands, but did nothing to interfere with the
feasibility study. But the seeds for the political discord that appeared later were
sown at this time. Proper protocol in Himba society would require the engineers,
or any other visitor, to directly approach the appropriate Himba chief and request
his permission to construct the camp and to conduct the various research
activities. 92 Although some rudimentary effort was made to obtain such permis-
sion, it is clear that the Himba were not fully consulted, did not realize the extent
of this intrusion on their lands, and did not clearly recognize exactly what their"permission" was requested for.
Rather, NAMANG apparently assumed that this land was "state land" and that
the Namibian government had authorized their use of it, and that they needed to
approach the Himba for "permission" only for symbolic reasons. For over a year,
several dozen engineers or other experts went to work every day, literally passing
through Himba villages, or homesteads, gardens, or graveyards, without engag-
ing the people trespassing on various kinds of "private" places, traditionally
guarded by particular Himba families. The Himba felt angry and betrayed;
misinformed about the purpose and extent of the project.93
Because the Namibian government did not want to acknowledge Himba
property rights by more formally requesting their permission to live and work on
Himba lands or by discussing the dam project with them, the Himba viewed the
government's actions as direct affronts to their political and property rights. As
long as the Ministry of Mines and Energy viewed the land as "state land," and the
Himba were not seen as a physical threat to the project, there was no need to
acknowledge Himba property rights. Another possible answer, equally offensive
in Himba eyes, is that the slight was inadvertent and nobody even thought to ask
the people actually living at the dam site. Engineers working at the site believed
that the Namibian government had dealt with the local people and that dealing
with such local social issues was not in their job description.94
91. I visited the region in 1995 during the feasibility study work and again in 2001; much of the material
which follows is from personal observation or interview.
92. See generally Rachel L. Swains, Losing Track of the Centuries, N.Y. TIMES, April 2, 2000, at Travel 8-9
(describing the process of organizing a tourist visit to a Himba village).
93. BOLLIG, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, supra note 37, at 82-90. There is no clear agreement about exactly
what was said to the Himba at this time and the issue of this "miscommunication" is still unresolved.
94. I was present on several occasions when engineers simply walked through groups of Himba without even
acknowledging their presence. There were also serious language difficulties as none of the engineers spoke
Hereto, and few Himba speak European languages.
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6. Variations of the Dam Scheme
a. Engineering Concern
Different variations of the dam scheme emerged from this research. The
rugged terrain changes at Epupa Falls made it a difficult engineering feat. Above
the falls, the river runs through a broad valley, lined by gently rolling hills, set
back several miles from the water. The hills would contain the impoundment
behind the dam, but only in the form of a very broad and shallow lake up to five
miles wide, and approximately forty miles long. Except for the remoteness of the
site, it is a "perfect" location for a large dam.
This "Epupa site" would be the easiest to build, using existing dam technology,
but such technology would be highly disruptive of Himba life because it would
require flooding a broad valley extensively used by herders and farmers. This
valley is the heart of Himba territory, holding hundreds of important sites such as
graveyards, gardens, herding camps and households. The construction of the dam
here would block traditional traveling routes between Namibia and Angola.
Although only 600-1000 Himba actually live in the area to be flooded, at least
3500 to 4000, approximately 25% of the people, use the area at some point during
the year.95 In drought years, the river is of much greater importance, because it is
the final place where herds can be watered.96
Immediately below the falls, the river drops through a steep canyon, with the
mountains close to the river. Here, the impoundment would be narrow and deep,
and the dam would be just over six hundred feet high-the highest dam in Africa.
In contrast, the "Baynes" site, about twenty miles west of Epupa Falls, would
create more technical difficulties and higher construction costs, but would
displace far fewer people because the mountainous area is much less inhabited or
used for grazing.97 An impoundment placed here, however, would hold much less
water, and would cause the dam to produce less power. While the Baynes site is
less damaging to the environment and to Himba culture, it would require relying
on water stored in existing impoundments further upriver in Angola. A dam at the
Baynes site is therefore less profitable and more politically vulnerable, because of
its dependence on Angola.
'Additional engineering problems existed. Because the Kunene is a small river
with a seasonal flow, a large dam would require an extensive reservoir to store
water in the wet season to use to make power in the dry season. The area is a high
desert and such a huge reservoir would have a high evaporation rate. This
95. Draft Feasibility Report, supra note 5, at v. 8, 23.
96. POWER CoNFLiCTs, supra note 90, at ch. 12.
97. While the Lower Cunene Hydropower Scheme Feasibility Study technically focuses on both the Baynes
and Epupa sites, it has always been the Epupa site that has been the focus and the entire scheme is popularly
referred to as the "Epupa" Dam, a usage followed here.
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evaporation would waste vast quantities of water in one of the driest countries in
the world, and would have unknown potential environmental costs, including
possible climate changes. The Baynes site, because it is much narrower and is
hemmed in by steep canyon walls, will hold much less water, therefore requiring
reservoirs up-river to operate it at full efficiency. But, it is also much more
remote, necessitating a larger and more expensive road construction effort and
increased construction costs.
The smaller power generating capacity of the Baynes Dam would also change
the economics of the project, producing less hydropower to sell to repay the debt.
Geographically, the Baynes site is more accessible from Angola; more remote
from Namibia. The construction of the Baynes dam would for the first time offer
an independent Angola a choice in how its water resources might be used for its
own development. Moreover, as the Baynes site is dependent on the rehabilita-
tion of the Gove Dam in central Angola, its construction would be of further
benefit to the Angolans at the expense of the Namibians. While Namibia will
benefit from the electricity generated, construction in Angola will shift a greater
proportion of the construction budget and subsequent benefits to Angola, mean-
ing less revenue for Namibian construction companies.
The engineering portions of the Feasibility Study were done between 1995 and
1996. While judging the quality of this work is beyond the scope of lawyers, there
is some evidence of questionable practices. For example, although the volume of
water flow is an absolutely critical variable in a desert river, the engineers never
systematically measured it over the course of the two-year study. Rather, they
based their calculations on data from the flow of the Kunene River at Ruacana
and from the Okavango River at Rundu, almost five hundred miles to the east,
combined with a limited actual measurement of the flow at Epupa to develop a
theoretical model of the river flow. 98 It is not correct to estimate highly irregular
river flow volumes in this way, especially with a billion dollar project at stake.
b. Economic Concerns
This questionable estimate of the volume of water was carried through in
equally questionable economic projections. It is not a simple matter for a third
world country of less than two million people to pay off a US$ 600 million debt.
Despite basing the economic projections for the dam on the lowest possible cost
estimates and the highest possible power production estimates, the dam was still
only marginally a sound investment. Since cost overruns are routine in dam
construction projects, averaging 56%, 99 (at least US$ 400 million more in the
98. Hans Eggers, "Comments on the Epupa Draft Feasibility Study," International Rivers Network,
Independent Reviews of the Epupa Dam Feasibility Study, Jan. 1998.
99. Dams and Development, supra note 62, at 39, 40. These data are based on an average for 81 large dam
projects. While there is wide variability in the range of cost overruns, they are consistently high. Moreover, the
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Epupa case, making it a billion dollar project), the income generated from a dam
is often insufficient to pay for its construction costs. Similarly, if revenue from
power were somehow lower than expected, the dam could also not pay for itself.
Additionally, if water levels dropped, reducing power production (as has hap-
pened every year at Ruacana), the dam would likely not be profitable. This would
burden the Namibian government with foreign debt that it could not repay.'00
Thus, there are three different scenarios, each independently possible, that
counter the projections that the Epupa Dam is economically viable.
c. Additional Studies
Additionally, the dam planners did not initiate the various social and environ-
mental studies until very late in the study, almost as an afterthought. Given the
recent World Bank reassessment of its policies regarding the construction of large
dams because of the impact on local populations, the lack of attention to the
"issue" of the Himba, who calmly herded their cattle right past the planners'
safari tents, is incomprehensible.
This failure to study the effects of the proposed dam on the Himba and their
culture was not accidental. The Namibian government, represented here through
the Ministry of Mines and Energy and SWAWEK, maintained the South African
era colonial mentality and did not acknowledge that the Himba might have any
legal or social interest in the Epupa Dam scheme. There was no question that the
Himba could not be moved cheaply and without difficulty further into desert
Kaokoland. There was, however, some concern with environmental issues
because Namibia has a well-developed environmental science apparatus and the
Kunene River and its riparian ecosystem supports some species that are rare and
endangered.01 These environmental issues, while substantial, have been overshad-
owed by the Himba and their opposition to the dam.
IV. "THERE WILL BE No DAM HERE": THE HIMBA CONFRONT THE DAM
BUILDERS: A DISCOURSE ON NAMIBIAN DEVELOPMENT
Any confrontation between tribal peoples and modern development assumes
unique qualities because, by definition, these events are defined by cultural forces
that are fluid and in formation. In this situation, the Himba and their cattle are
posed against a huge dam built by international conglomerates.
funding process itself may encourage cost overruns because funding ability itself is based on favorable cost
estimates.
100. Steve Rivkin, A Review of the Epupa Draft Feasibility Study, International Rivers Network, in
Independent Reviews of the Epupa Dam Feasibility Study, supra note 98.
101. Lower Cunene Hydropower Scheme Feasibility Study, Environmental Impact, vols. 1-15 (on file with
author).
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A. THE HIMBA LEADER
Hikuminue Kapika, the traditional chief of the area that includes the Epupa
Dam, is an unlikely actor on this scene. He is one of fifteen Himba chiefs, and one
of four whose lands border the Kunene River as it courses through Kaokoland.
Over eighty years old, he speaks only Herero, the language of the Himba, never
having had enough contact with the South Africans to learn Afrikaans. A rich
man, Kapika owns vast herds in both Namibia and Angola. He lives in Omu-
ranga, a mud, stick and thatch settlement of a few hundred people, with no
electricity, twenty miles south of Epupa Falls.' 0 2 The opposition of Kapika and
his people to the dam has been bold and loud, a simple theme repeated over and
over: "God gave us this land. It is our land. You cannot build your dam here. Go
away."
B. THE "PUBLIC" MEETING
As the Feasibility Study went forward, problems began to develop between the
locals and the dam builders. The conflict spilled into the open at a "public"
meeting held at Epupa Falls in August of 1995 to the surprise of the government
and the engineers. 10 3 The meeting was scheduled as a consultation with the local
community, as part of the Feasibility Study process. The Permanent Joint
Technical Commission, originally established by South Africa and Portugal in
1969, is an agency of both the Angolan and Namibian governments to develop
the Kunene River and the Epupa Dam.'o4 The commission meets approximately
once a year, usually alternating between Windhoek and Luanda. Andamo Toivo
ya Toivo, then the Namibian Minister of Mines and Energy, led the Namibian
delegation. The location of the meeting at Epupa was therefore especially
significant.
The idea of this public meeting at Epupa Falls was likely conceived as an
opportunity for celebration of the dam and for photographs documenting the
approval of local peoples for the dam. The closest town is about a hundred twenty
miles and four hours away on poor dirt roads, so the logistics of such a meeting
are formidable. This was the second meeting at the falls; the first, a consultation
with local officials a year earlier, resulted in a report that local peoples had given
their approval to the dam. 10 5 Thus, the plan for the second, larger and more
formal meeting was to carry this theme forward to this a propagandized event,
showing local people meeting with the dam builders.
102. The son of a famous chief, Munemuholo Kapika, who died in 1982 at age 102, Kapika was born in
Angola and has lived his entire life within a few miles of Epupa.
103. Obviously a "public" meeting at a place where few people live is a symbolic kind of meeting. This one
was on the banks of the Kunene River, a few hundred yards downstream from the camp of the feasibility study.
104. JOHN PALLETT, SHARING WATER IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 85-89 (1997).
105. Inker Hoogenhout, Swawek States the Facts on Epupa, TEMPO, Feb. 19, 1995.
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A small circle of white folding chairs was set up on a sand bar under palm trees
along the bank of the Kunene River. During the previous night two armored
vehicles, "Caspirs" inherited from the South African army, came up the rough
track along the river from Ruacana bringing a visible symbol of Namibian
governmental administration to the area. About forty armed soldiers occupied the
site, infuriating the Himba because they saw this as a governmental show of force
directed at them. The soldiers milled around in a casual demeanor, one of them
distributing handbills advertising shares of stock in a mercantile company in
Ovamboland. A handful of Toyota Land Cruisers arrived from Opuwo, carrying
about twenty regional governmental officials. A few Ovambo businessmen also
arrived, representing the "dam boosters" in the region. Additionally, two small
airplanes arrived, carrying government officials from Windhoek and Angola,
respectively. With the attendance of perhaps fifty Himba and twenty scientists
from the Feasibility Study camp, there were approximately a hundred people at
the meeting. 10 6
Surprisingly, the Himba took over the meeting. The respective ministers had
hardly gotten past words of welcome, when Chief Kapika, politely but firmly
interrupted the proceedings. He reminded the listeners that he had repeatedly
opposed the dam, but that no one had consulted the Himba. He explained that he
didn't understand the purpose of the meeting, declared that "there will be no dam
here," and concluded that there was no need for a meeting to discuss it. He talked
at great length, going through the history of the land, the uses his people made of
it, their first knowledge of the plan for the dam, the intrusion of the camp and the
Feasibility Study, repeating that the government had ignored the Himbas'
ownership of the land. His language was bold and powerful. At one point, when a
small herd of goats wandered through the meeting, he interrupted Minister Toivo
ya Toivo, pointing out that the goats had more of a right to the land than the
government did because the goats at least lived there. Kapika also gestured at the
armored vehicles, saying that the current Namibian government was treating his
people worse than the South Africans had, and claimed that he wasn't afraid of
the army.
Other Himba spoke as well, echoing the same message. While they were civil
in their demeanor, their language was powerful and highly offensive to the
Namibian government. Comparing the SWAPO government unfavorably to the
South African government is powerful rhetoric in modern Namibia. Similarly,
saying that goats have more right to land than the Namibian government ridicules
the state's claim to ownership of the communal lands. These word choices were
not accidental; strong language is common in Namibian politics.
The carefully planned meeting had gone wrong, embarrassing the Namibian
106. I was present at this meeting, held on Aug. 24, 1995. See Sidney L. Harring, There will be No Dam
Here: Himba Leaders Confront the Government, It WORLD RIVERS REVIEW (June 1996), available at
http://www.im.org/pubs/wrr/9606/9606namibia.html.
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government. The officials and the engineers working on the study were taken
aback by this level of local opposition, seemingly unaware that it existed. The
strong statements of opposition from the Himba had been clear and unambigu-
ous, but they were an absolute surprise to the officials present. Minister Toivo ya
Toivo promised that the Himba would be consulted before the plans for the dam
were finalized. Gerd Burmeister, managing director of the engineering firm that
was responsible for the feasibility study, spoke, saying that the plan was to
construct a "very large dam" that would significantly disrupt Himba society.
Burmeister also promised to consult with the Himba and not to build the dam
until the local residents' views had been taken into account. The meeting, which
had lasted about two hours, broke up on an unsettled note. From this point on the
Namibian government was aware that it faced substantial local resistance to the
dam project. The government's strategy quickly emerged: the Himba were
attacked as "backward and primitive" and their opposition was attributed to"outside agitators" such as NGOs, lawyers and other members of the environmen-
tal movement. This discourse continues to the present.
C. HIMBA OPPOSITION TO THE DAM
The origin of Himba opposition to the dam is difficult to document. There are
many stories, but no documented moment that opposition began. There is an oral
history that begins with the Himba being told by various officials that the
government was considering building a "dam" on the Kunene River above the
Epupa Falls, but the word "dam" was translated into Herero as a small earth dam,
the kind built to impound small seasonal rivers for water for cattle. 10 7 The Himba
had no understanding of a large hydroelectric dam, and no understanding of the
flooding of the heart of their lands with a reservoir approximately forty miles
long. Indeed, there are no such reservoirs anywhere in their country.
It seems that for several years the Himba were generally aware of plans for a
"dam," but had no idea of the scope of the project until it was explained to them,
perhaps in 1993 or 1994. It is not clear who first explained this to the Himba,
although several different people may have brought it up on several different
occasions. One anthropologist reports that a registered letter in English announc-
ing plans for the pre-feasibility study and generally describing the proposed
dam was sent to the illiterate Himba chiefs in 1993. He found it unopened when a
chief produced it from a corner of his hut. 1o8 By this time the scope of the project
was widely known throughout Namibia, so word could have reached the
Himba through many different sources. At that time, engineers, government
107. Chief Katjira Muniombara put this simply: "In our world a dam is a small thing that gives cattle water.
What you are talking about is something else and will finish the Himba." Ezzell, supra note 4.
108. POWER CONFLICTS, supra note 90 (quoting Chris Tapscott, a Namibian anthropologist and consultant to
the pre-feasibility study).
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functionaries, tourists and missionaries regularly passed through Himba lands,
and several anthropologists resided there. Regardless of how or when they
actually learned of the dam, the Namibian government did not adequately present
the Epupa proposal to the Himba before they sent scientists to their lands.' 0 9
The Himba resented their land being taken for a dam without their consent.
The issue was not only that their land would be taken for a dam, disrupting their
lives and culture; it was the disrespect shown them in the process by SWAWEK
and the government. There are also stories of various Namibian government
functionaries passing out small gifts, including liquor, telling the Himba that the
land was not theirs, promising great benefits if the dam were built.110
The earlier June 1994 meeting can now be re-assessed. The Himba honestly
came to "be consulted" about what they believed to be a small dam. From their
point of view they sat and listened as the government and SWAWEK made their
presentations. Dozens of people present made statements, including many from
local politicians strongly supporting the dam, while Chief Kapika and his people
politely listened. Kapika, himself, did not speak, except to defer to his counselor,
who spoke saying that the Himba needed more time to consider the matter. 11
Two issues emerged from this. First the Himba's silence was mistaken for
either acquiescence or even approval, and second, the full extent of the plan and
its disruption of Himba life for the dam was not accurately presented. By 1995, a
year later, the Himba, with more information and more time for internal
discussion, had become opposed to the dam. It also seems that the Himba had
become angry with the government for misleading them, for ignoring them, and
for trespassing on their lands without acknowledging their rights.
D. THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF MODERN NAMIBIA
The political history of modem Namibia is relevant here because the poor
relationship between the Himba and the Namibian government has been a long
time forming. The Himba and the Ovambo, while not enemies, have traditionally
had an arm's length and commercial relationship. The Kaokoland Region, with a
large Himba and Herero population, does not support SWAPO, the ruling party of
Namibia, which is dominated by the Ovambo. Ovambo people, in turn, dominate
the entire governmental apparatus, including the local government of Kunene
Region, of which Kaokoland is a part. Businessmen and politicians, many of
them Ovambo, stand to make enormous profits from the construction of the dam,
subcontracting for a wide variety of materials from food to asphalt and cement to
machinery. Because Kaokoland is so underdeveloped, much of the construction
money will flow through Ovamboland, immediately to the east.
109. BOLLIG, RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, supra note 37, at 82-90.
110. Id.
111. Hoogenhout, supra note 105.
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While these profits would be realized even without corruption, and the level of
corruption in Namibia is not particularly high, in Namibia, as in other countries,
such contracts often require various "kick-backs" or under the table "business
partnerships" to various government officials." 12 Thus, issues of national develop-
ment and self-sufficiency become merged with the growing specter of ordinary
self-interest and corruption, driven by the extraordinary profits that flow from this
particular form of "development."
The sheer economic expenditure of the Epupa project (the US$ 1 billion cost -
including cost overruns) makes it the largest single Namibian development
project. The project will make many people, in and out of government, rich, and
directly and indirectly provide jobs or income for thousands more. The Namibian
government, like the governments of many third world countries, has been
spending a fortune on construction, all on borrowed money: the Epupa Dam
project is distinguished only by its great size and cost. The skyline of Windhoek
has changed dramatically since 1995, with the construction of several dozen
expensive, non-descript government buildings, mostly debt-financed. It is not
clear how the small and poor country is going to repay this debt. The government
of Namibia, solidly in the hands of SWAPO which controls the National Council,
has become increasingly insensitive to the concerns of minority tribal peoples in
Namibia, reflecting both the Ovambos' 60% majority of the population and also
traditional tribal rivalries. The country faces a serious risk of destabilization,
prompting concerns about human rights.' 1 3
In 1994 the Rehoboth Baster community sued the government over a complex
land issue that resulted from the government displacing Baster people from farms
they had occupied for over a hundred years. The Basters' lost the case, but remain
bitter over their treatment by government officials. 114 In 1997 communities of
Kxoe Bushmen were moved off their lands in Caprivi to make way for expensive
tourist "safari" camps. These people dispersed, with large numbers fleeing to
neighboring Botswana. 1 5 In 1999 a small insurrection was mounted in Caprivi as
the Fwe, another small tribe with a long history of grievances against the
112. Pieter Mietzner, Namibia's No. 30 on Transparency, NEW EPA, 2 July 2001, at 1-2. The 2001
"Corruptions Perception Index" of Transparency International listed Namibia number 30, close behind
Botswana (26), about the middle third for corruption in the world, but second lowest in Africa. By contrast
Nigeria and Bangladesh, at 90 and 91, respectively, have the highest levels of official corruption in the world
while Finland, Denmark, and New Zealand (at 1, 2 and 3, respectively) the lowest. SWAPO has tabled
anti-corruption legislation in the National Council, and Prime Minister Hage Geingob has spoken out against
official corruption.
113. See Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Department of State, Human Rights
Practices for 1998 Report, Namibia Country Report, Feb. 1999, available at http://www.state.gov/www/globalU
humanrights/1998_hrp report/namibia.html (last visited Aug. 15, 2001).
114. See The Rehoboth Bastergemeente v. The Government of the Republic of Namibia, Case No. SA5/05,
delivered May 14, 1996. See also Angelique Groenewaldt, Rehoboth Government: A Misconception or Genuine
Cry?, NAMIBIA REvIEw Nov.-Dec. 1999, at 18-22.
115. Playing Politics in West Caprivi, NAMIBIAN, June 20, 1997.
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Namibian government, carried out an armed attack on a Namibian police post in
Katima Mulilo, the regional capital. Several dozen people were killed as a result
of that fight and the army's retaliation against the Fwe. Hundreds of people were
arrested on treason charges and still remain in prison, awaiting trial. 1 6 Obvi-
ously, treason trials of hundreds of disaffected rival tribe members in a small
country has an enormous political impact on a new and fragile democracy. The
government's overreaction may be calculated to send a message to other
disaffected minority tribes.
The Himba are not politically isolated, but are allies with their Herero
relatives, in the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), the leading opposition to
SWAPO. There are about 100,000 Herero in Namibia, a small population
compared to the Ovambo. However, with about the same population as the
Kavango and Damara, the Herero are among three tribes ranking as the next
largest tribes in Namibia. 117 The Herero are also advantaged by their geographi-
cal position, in the colonial heartland of Namibia, and a well-established
traditional system of chiefs and government. The Herero have been pressing
claims for compensation for the loss of their lands in central Namibia to the
Germans after the Herero War of 1904-05.1"8 These claims are opposed by
SWAPO, who claim that no particular group is entitled to compensation since all
tribes suffered under colonialism.
In this context, the Herero's blocking of the Epupa Dam, the largest potential
development project in the entire country, takes on a new, and very political,
meaning. The idea of forcibly removing the Himba from their lands does not faze
the SWAPO government; this is how politics is practiced in modern Namibia. It
would amount to settling a score against the Herero, providing a clear example of
what happens to people who get in the way of SWAPO development projects. It
also goes a long way toward explaining how the government could promote such
a large dam project for several years without consulting with the people who live
there. The simple answer is twofold: first, the Himba did not matter to the
government, and second, there was no political reason to even acknowledge their
legal rights in the face of the dam.
Other political factors enter this process as well. The Namibian government
now represents a powerful black elite with interests distinct from the poor
villagers in the north. To them, "development" means electricity and modern
buildings, and a vision of an industrially developed Namibia. Similarly, the
116. It is still not entirely clear what occurred on August 2, 1999 and there is some evidence that the
government of Namibia has exaggerated the nature of the insurrection. MARIA FISCH, THE SECESSIONIST
MOVEMENT IN THE CAPRIVI: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1999).
117. The Namibian census of 1993-94 did not take account of ethnic identification. The 1989 census reported
Herero, Kavango, and Damara has having 7.5% of the population each, or about 100,000 each based on the
current population estimate of 1.6 million. MALAN, supra note 18, at 2.
118. John Grobler, The Tribe Gennany Wants to Forget, ELECTRONIC MAIL AND GUARDIAN, March 13, 1998,
at http://www.mg.co.za/mg/ (last visited Aug. 10, 2001).
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SWAPO government strongly rejects any idea of "tribal" interests, citing a
history of tribal civil wars in Africa as undermining African development." 9
E. MODELS OF DEVELOPMENT
This political dispute also contains a discourse on development that was put
forward in plain language; there are different models of development that must be
considered, even within the context of Namibian politics. The DTA opposition in
Parliament demanded that the government consult the traditional chiefs before it
proceed with the Epupa project, asserting that the decision making process was
defective in that it overemphasized the role of SWAPO party functionaries at
various levels of government and failed to consult traditional leaders, a com-
pletely valid criticism of the process. 120 Chief Kapika is the traditional chief of
the area that includes the dam, holding traditional governmental authority in the
area-a political position recognized in the Namibian Constitution. 12'
Similarly, organized Namibian and international environmental groups raised
obvious issues about the social and environmental impact of the project, another
discussion rooted in a vast, world-wide experience with large dams and their
accompanying economic and social costs, which are often born disproportion-
ately by remote indigenous populations.' 22 The NAMIBIAN, an influential and
often critical national newspaper, raised basic issues about the political process
underlying the dam project and challenged the basic economic soundness of the
project itself. 123 What distinguishes Namibia from many other African nations is
that there is generally a free press and open political disagreement with govern-
mental policies. Therefore, the Himba's position is well known throughout
Namibia and receives accurate coverage in the press.
119. Ten years after Namibian independence, scholars are just beginning to develop an analysis of the
politics of the Namibian state. See INGOFF DIENER & OLIVIER GRAFE, CONTEMPORARY NAMIBIA: THE FIRST
LANDMARKS OF A POST-APARTHEID SOCIETY, (2001).
120. Christof Maletsky, Epupa Could Result in Himba Court Case, NAMIBIAN Feb. 21, 1997. DTA Vice
President Katuutire Kaura pointed out that under Article 102(5) of the Namibian Constitution requires the
government to appoint and consult with a Council of Traditional Leaders. His point was that such a council
would have given the government different advice on the dam than it got from party underlings and technocrats.
This is a direct critique of the political process that underlies who makes "development" decisions and what
social values are embodied in those decisions.
121. Article 66 recognizes the "customary law" of Namibia as long as it does not conflict with the
Constitution or statutory law. Article Ill recognizes the power of "local authorities," which include the
traditional authorities. CONSTrLnON OF NAMIBIA, available at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/wa00000_.html
(last visited Aug. 10, 2001).
122. Earthlife Namibia and the International Rivers Network worked together on a critique of the dam.
Werner Menges, No Bridging Dam Divide, NAMIBIAN, Feb. 9, 1998.
123. See generally Editorial, Epupa Decision very Worrying, NAMIBIAN, Feb. 21, 1997; Editorial, Need for a
Clean Debate on Epupa, NAMIBIAN, July 19, 1996; Editorial, Nyamu Discredits Epupa Process, NAMIBIAN,
March 14, 1997. The government, over this and other issues, has stopped purchasing the newspaper, claiming
that it is anti-government in its reporting.
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F. OWNERSHIP OF THE LAND
A legal framing of the Epupa Dam issues followed shortly after the articulation
of the same issues. Legal posturing began in 1995 in the context of this debate
over development.' 24 The immediate issue that concerned the Himba was the
obvious legal question of who owned the land. The question of land ownership
underlies the construction of the dam; with so much land being either used or
flooded, the government's assertion that it owned all the land was an affront to the
Himba, as well as of great practical significance in the effort to stop the dam. The
builder of the dam would have to own the land. Similarly, if the Himba owned the
land, they thought they would have a right to live there as well as standing to
object to the dam project. The legal history of dam building is replete with cases
denying the land rights of the tribal peoples living in the path of dams. Therefore,
this issue became key in framing the Himba's opposition to the dam.
G. ADDITIONAL LEGAL ISSUES
This issue of land ownership was of the utmost significance, but it became
apparent that there were other issues as well. The shoddy quality of the
Feasibility Study and the enormous environmental damage that would be caused
by the dam raised a number of potential legal questions in the areas of
environmental law and administrative law. Environmental law is very underdevel-
oped in Namibia, and there is little to guide the courts in dealing with environmen-
tal matters as complex as those raised by the Epupa Dam. In general, matters of
environmental protection receive a low priority, perhaps typical of third world
countries with more pressing domestic issues. 125 Even if Namibia, or any other
third world country, had a regime of environmental law, it is unlikely that it
would be adequate to legally regulate the construction of a large dam because of
the extra-ordinary technical complexity of such an enterprise.
Article 95 of the Namibian Constitution requires that the "state shall actively
promote and maintain the welfare of the people by adopting policies aimed at
maintenance of ecosystems essentially ecological processes and biological diver-
sity of Namibia and utilization of living natural resources on a sustainable basis
for the benefit of all Namibians, both present and future.. ,,26 This language,
however, is contained in a section of the Constitution delineating "principles of
124. Maletsky, supra note 120. This article was the first report of a legal framing of the case. The Himba,
however, first met with lawyers in a preliminary way, in the fall of 1994 and, in the fall of 1995, met with the
Legal Assistance Centre to discuss their legal options. The content of those discussions is confidential, a
lawyer's advice to his clients.
125. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Richardson, Environmental Law in Postcolonial Societies: Straddling the
Local-Global Institutional Spectrum, II COLO. J. INt'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2000) (discussing reasons for
underdeveloped environmental law in third world countries).
126. CONSTrrMON OF NAMiBIA, Article 95 (1), available athttp://www.uni-wuerzburg.delaw/waOOOOO_.htmi.
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state policy" rather than setting out "rights." Moreover, this language is so
general that it is subject to judicial interpretation in a country where courts give
great weight to political decision-makers. 27 A court has no way to measure"sustainable" use of natural resources, for example, but must defer to scientists
working for various government ministries.
Administrative law issues are even more difficult for courts to address. The
fact that SWAWEK (now Nampower) is a parastatal corporation raises these
issues, because although it has substantial corporate powers to act independently
of the Namibian government, it is still a government body under the Ministry of
Mines and Energy. This relationship was underscored as the drafters of the
Feasibility Study blamed the Namibian government for the failure of the required
social impact study, arguing that the government neglected its political duty to
build a relationship with the local people. 128 However, like environmental law,
administrative law in Namibia is underdeveloped, making these governmental
failures difficult to translate into violations of administrative law.
In 1997 and 1998, the discourse on development in the context of the Epupa
Dam became increasingly polarized and politicized, a test of loyalty to the
SWAPO government. At a meeting in Opuwo in March of 1997, Jesaya Nyamu,
then Deputy Minister of Mines and Energy (and presently the Minister), an-
nounced that the dam would be built, no matter what the Feasibility Study
concluded.' 29 This confirmed the worst of the opposition's fears. The Himba
announced that they would not cooperate any further with the Feasibility Study
since their input could not matter after a decision had been reached. Therefore,
the critical final step of studying the impact of the dam on the local population
and developing a mitigation scheme could not be completed. 130
H. THE NAMIBIAN RESPONSE
At this point, President Sam Nujoma entered the fray, denouncing "foreign"
agitators for "using" the Himba to oppose the dam for their own selfish reasons.
In a speech to foreign diplomats, he stated that "the Government will not be
deterred by the misguided activities of those who want to impede economic
development and upliftment of the standards of living of our people.... We
fought for human rights, democracy and social change. We refuse to succumb to
sinister manipulations and misinformation of people who do not have Namibia's
interest at heart."' 13 1 In another speech he accused the Legal Assistance Centre,
127. Deon Obbes, Maintaining Biological Diversity -A Namibian Constitutional Perspective, 6 S. AFRICAN
J. ENVTL. L& POL'Y 161 (1999).
128. Draft Feasibility Report, supra note 5.
129. Legal Assistance Centre Pamphlet, supra note 86, at 16.
130. Id.
131. Chrispin Inambao, Epupa Gets Green Light, Nujoma Slams 'Sinister Manipulators,' NAMIBIAN, Aug.
19, 1997, at 1.
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the only public interest law firm in Namibia, and the lawyers for the Himba, of
being unpatriotic, and interfering in Namibian development by representing
foreign interests. 132 The full weight of the government had come down on the
side of the Epupa Dam, with or without the Feasibility Study.
The government continued its support of the dam by authorizing a police raid
in November 1997 on a meeting between the Himba and their Legal Assistance
Centre lawyers held at Omuramba, Chief Kapika's village. The police's pretext
was that the meeting was in violation of a South African-era statute that
prohibited large public meetings without a permit. The Legal Assistance Centre
argued in court that the statute was unconstitutional and was not applicable to a
meeting between lawyers and their clients. The Centre sought an injunction
against the local chief of police to prohibit him from interrupting future meetings
with their clients. The injunction was granted, to the embarrassment of the
government, and the judge declared the colonial-era law that the police relied on
unconstitutional. 33 The government then obtained an injunction against Chief
Kapika by claiming that his language was threatening, despite the fact that they
used it out of context. Chief Kapika was ordered not to injure various government
officials. 134
I. PRESENTATION OF THE EPUPA FEASIBILITY STUDY
The Epupa Feasibility Study was publicly presented at a well-attended meeting
in Windhoek in February of 1998.135 The social aspects of the study, mostly
relating to the dispossession of the Himba, were the topics of focus, although
technical data dominated most of the study. Two of the most eminent anthropolo-
gists working with the Himba, Margaret Jacobsohn and Michael Bollig, were
hired to hastily complete this part of the study. Both had long relationships with
the Himba and integrity beyond question, necessary at this point to overcome the
hostile situation that had developed.
The reason that Jacobsohn and Bollig were approached so late in the process
itself reveals some measure of bad faith on the part of the designers of the
feasibility study process. The project had originally hired a team of social
scientists from the University of Namibia, apparently assuming that they would
write a routine report diminishing Himba concerns and thereby open the way for
the removal of the Himba from the Epupa area. These scholars, who are not
named here, not only failed to get the work done, but were so untrustworthy that
the Himba would not even talk to them. The integrity of Jacobsohn and Bollig
132. Id.
133. Chrispin Inambao, Nujoma Showing Signs of Dictator: Lawyers Want Police Education in Constitution,
NAMIBIAN, Aug. 20, 1997, at 1.
134. Personal communication, Andrew Corbett, Director, Legal Assistance Centre, 1999.
135. Werner Menges, Last Stand on Epupa: OvaHimba Flatly Reject all Dam Sites, NAMIBIAN, Feb. 9, 1998,
[Vol. 14:35
THE OVAHIMBA AND THE EPUPA DAM
also structured their conclusions, which was an obvious problem for the dam
builders. The scientists were well aware of the significant Himba interests in the
region and their well-established culture that would, in fact, be severely impacted
by construction of the dam. Because of the extensive publicity, the government
was forced to recognize the Himba's interests, as included in the Feasibility
Study. It was too late to complete the critical (and required) "social mitigation"
report. Such a study should have determined and proposed the measures needed
to "mitigate" damage to the Himba and their culture by the proposed dam.'
36
However, one questions how such a grave threat to a traditional culture could be
"mitigated." Where could a substantial pastoral culture, including tens of thou-
sands of cattle, be moved anywhere in Namibia? If the Himba were relocated
without their herds to rural slums, how can the effect of such cataclysmic social
change be mitigated? The Feasibility Study contained a few references to
population relocation schemes done before other dams were built, but neglected
to point out that none of these schemes were successful. 137 At its most disingenu-
ous, the Study pointed out that, since the Himba were poor, it would not cost
much to move them, therefore keeping "social mitigation" costs down. 138 In fact,
since mitigation and relocation costs were not included in the Feasibility Study,
its economic projections resulted in artificially low cost estimates.
With the abandonment of the social impact and mitigation study, the Epupa
Scheme became an "outlaw" project in the world of modern hydropower
development. In the year 2000, it is not possible to plan such a project without
addressing the needs of the local population. 139 The World Bank, for example,
adopted new standards for funding dams in the mid- 1990s as a result of concerns
about displaced local populations. 140 Additionally, as the World Commission on
Dams report concluded, virtually all cases of removal and relocation of indig-
enous people by dams has led to social disaster for the people involved. 141
136. As of August, 2001, it was not even under way. Nampower insists that it is the Himba who have
prevented this study by refusing to co-operate. While a number of views of this are possible, one is simply that
the duty to conduct a social mitigation study rests with Nampower and the whole matter, including Himba
resistance, is their responsibility. The idea that an indigenous people might, for their own selfish reasons, block a
social mitigation study is theoretically interesting, but a gross distortion of the political process that
accompanies a large dam. Conflict in planning large dam projects is not unexpected and can be mitigated by
proper discussion and planning. Resolve Inc, Participation, Negotiation and Conflict Management in Large
Dam Projects, World Commission on Dams, Thematic Review v. 5, available at http://www.dams.org.
137. Lower Cunene Hydropower Scheme Feasibility Study, Environmental Assessment, supra note 101, at
v. 13,2. 3.
138. Id. at v. 8, 2. Sidney L. Harring, "Commentary on the Environmental Assessment Report of the
Feasibility Study on the Proposed Lower Cunene Hydropower Scheme," in International Rivers Network,
Lower Cunene Hydropower Scheme Feasibility Study Review, 1-2.
139. It is useful to recall here that the "study" didn't even count the local population. The government of
Namibia and the Epupa project planners do not know how many Himba there are. In addition, 600 to 1,000 are
listed as living in the area to be flooded: nobody even knows how many people live in the area.
140. POWER CoNFLicrs, supra note 90, at ch. 3.
141. Dams and Development Report, supra note 62, at 97-112.
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Also lost in the chaos of the social impact study was the environmental impact
study. The Epupa Dam also was likely to create serious ecological consequences
that could not be mitigated. The Kunene River, which flows through the world's
driest desert, is the only permanent water source which can support a riparian
environment for hundreds of miles. Many of the endemic species present have
been isolated in the Kunene Valley for centuries are potentially doomed by the
dam. 142 The environmental impact study concluded that the Epupa Dam would
cause great damage to the environment. Across the board, socially and environ-
mentally, the Epupa Dam would be a drain on human and environmental
resources.
J. THE NAMIBIAN GOVERNMENT VERSUS THE HIMBA
The harsh criticism of the Feasibility Study only hardened the position of the
Namibian government. It increased its attacks on the Himba by calling them
"backward" and "primitive," and by spouting nationalistic and isolationist
rhetoric. Minister of Trade and Industry Hidipo Hamutenya told the BBC: "[tihey
(the Himba) need to cope with the vagaries of nature-the heat and the cold-by
putting on what everybody else has; ties and suits, rather than being half naked
and half dressed." 143
The Namibian government repeatedly asserted that it was prepared to go ahead
with the dam and claimed that other countries were contacting Namibia, eager to
finance the dam project. Rumors of Arab and Malaysian money circulated,
always without particulars. In fact, no country has yet come forward to finance
the dam; once the project was demonstrated to be of only marginal economic
benefit, its attraction to lenders operating purely for economic reasons disap-
peared. The major providers of foreign aid, economic assistance rendered for
social rather than economic reasons, are mostly Western countries. Their con-
cerns about human rights cannot be met under the current Feasibility Study.
The Himba were not intimidated by the hostility of the government and
matched the increasing level of rhetoric. Chief Kapika proclaimed that if the dam
was built "we will all gather there and they will have to build the dam on top of
us.144 He and Chief Paulus Tjavara went on a tour of Europe, getting good press
and good crowds in Germany, Sweden, Norway and England.
Kapika addressed crowds of environmental activists and additionally went to the
foreign offices and leading banks in each country to ask them not to fund the Epupa
Dam. Not only was his visit well covered by the local press, but a number of foreign
142. Draft Feasibility Report, supra note 5, at Part A3.
143. Chrispin Inambao, Epupa Gets Green Light, Nujoma Slams Sinister Manipulators, NAmtiBIAN, Aug. 19,
1997. This statement is another example of the kind of rhetoric used in this dispute, much the kind of thing
South African officials might have said.
144. Id.
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officials promised not to finance the dam. Such promises were a powerful victory over
the Namibian government's insistence that it had numerous funding sources available.
In Norway, the chiefs requested a meeting with Norconsult to protest that company's
involvement in the Feasibility Study. When Norconsult responded that it was "unpre-
pared" to meet with them, Kapika announced he would come anyway. Norconsult
obviously could not work uninvited in Himba lands and then turn them away at their
door in front of local television cameras so it hastily agreed to meet with the Himba. 145
The visual image of these Himba chiefs clad in traditional clothing making the rounds
of expensive offices, asking people not to fund the Epupa Dam was powerfully
conveyed in Europe and was an embarrassment to the Namibian government. 4 The
Namibian Ministry of Mines and Energy put out a press statement alleging that Kapika
was the "tool of environmental extremists," calling his tour a "well organized farce
aimed at perpetuating European preconceptions and stereotypes about Africa."' 14 7
The problem with this approach was that, in a democracy, the Himba had every right
to take their case to the source of the funds or anywhere else they chose. The Namibian
government's response was inappropriate. 48 Because there was no similar way to get
prime time television coverage in Europe for their position favoring the dam, the
government clearly lost this part of the propaganda war. Because the Feasibility Study
itself had been discredited, the Himba had more overseas credibility than the Govern-
ment on the Epupa issue. Every claim they made about damage to their culture was
true, so the Ministry was unable to launch the kind of attacks they usually engaged in.
Democratic ideals, including the right to criticize the government, are not well
entrenched. Therefore, for the Himba to take their case directly to the funding sources
was seen by the SWAPO government as an act of great disloyalty, embarrassing
Namibia in the world, and undermining its national development.
But the Himba weren't finished with their political initiative. Two months after
the official release of the Feasibility Study, Chief Kapika announced the creation
of the Kaoko-Epupa Development Foundation, a Himba-led organization that
would focus on developing the region's economy, including sponsoring studies of
solar and wind power alternatives to the Epupa Dam, as well as protecting Himba
cultural traditions.1 49 Such an organization directly challenges the Namibian
government's monopoly over the development of Kaokoland.
145. Himba Make Headlines in Sweden, NAMIBIAN, July 2, 1997; Himba Come Face to Face with Epupa
Consultants in Norway, NAMIBIAN, June 27, 1997; European Support for Himba Mounts, NAMIBIAN, June 24,
1997; Himba Gain Support from German Banks, NAMIBIAN, June 20, 1997; Himbas Win Support in Germany,
NAMIBIAN June 16, 1997 (all available at http://www.saep.org/sadc/country/namibia/epuparticles.htm).
146. Mines Ministry Loses Cool over Himba Trip, NAMIBIAN, June 18, 1997.
147. Id.
148. Ministry's Approach is Embarrassing, NAMIBIAN, June 20, 1997.
149. Christoff Maletsky, Himba Seize Initiative: Kapika Heads New Development Body, NAMIBIAN, April 6,
1998.
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V. HIMBA LAND RIGHTS AT EPUPA FALLS
At its core, this dispute is about Himba land rights. But communal land rights
are complex, involving a number of considerations. The value of the land is the
most apparent measure of these rights, but such considerations are as much social
as economic.
A. VALUE OF THE LAND
One of the basic errors in the US$ 600 million cost estimate of the Epupa Dam
is that the Feasibility Study put the cost of the land, of relocation, of water, of the
environmental loss, at only US$ 2.6 million, plus the unknown cost of relocating
the Himba.150 This was based on the questionable assumption that the Govern-
ment of Namibia "owned" the communal lands, water, and natural resources.
Although this is the dominant view of communal land and water rights through-
out Africa and the world, it requires analysis, for it has great social and legal
consequences. While the Himba have objections to the dam on many levels, their
position is centered on their honest belief that they "own" the land, and the
government of Namibia cannot put a dam on their traditional lands. Therefore,
considerations of land and resources ownership underlie the legal position of
both sides. A number of complexities follow from different legal positions of the
underlying land ownership.
To begin, the simplest argument is that even if the government owns the land
and water, these elements still have value that must be calculated in the cost of the
dam and that doing so would raise the cost of the dam so much that it would no
longer be economical. Land, whether owned by the government or not, can only
be degraded or flooded at some cost to the nation. Water, especially in a desert
country, has value. The loss of various species has potential environmental costs,
even if the value cannot be neatly calculated. Moreover, these unknown social
costs are not "one-time" costs, valued at their loss at a particular point in time.
The loss of water is a continuous loss; a cost each year for the life of the dam. So,
not only would the cost of water in the present be lost to the dam, but the cost of
water in 2020 and 2040. Of course, no one can compute the value of water in
Namibia forty years from now. The same is true of the real cost of the land, and
the cost of the relocation of the Himba. The Himba culture is lost forever; the
tribe may need to be repeatedly relocated, and supported socially and economi-
cally for generations. An indirect cost in the loss of the value of Himba culture,
the contribution of the Himba, as a people, to Namibian development should also
be included in the calculations. Although there is no way to precisely determine
these "costs," they would appear conservatively to amount to several hundreds of
150. Steve Rivkin, A Review of the Epupa Draft Feasibility Study, International Rivers Network, 1998,
available at http://www.irn.org/pubs/index.shtmi.
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millions of dollars. 15 1
This puts the discussion of Himba land rights in perspective. The actual value
of their lands, however they are legally held, is only a small part of what is at
stake. But this issue is complex as well. Ordinarily, compensation to peoples
displaced by large dam construction only is paid to those with a legal title, an
obvious injustice to tribal peoples who lack access to lawyers and land registra-
tion offices.' 52 This puts a great, even impossible, burden on most tribal peoples
throughout the world. No one contests the fact that the Namibian Himba are the
exclusive occupants of their lands at Epupa, and have been so for at least a
hundred years. As original inhabitants, the Himba have substantial rights to their
land under natural law, the English common law, German colonial law, and
international law.153 Although Namibian courts have not yet recognized indig-
enous title, they should, under domestic law. They could only have lost their
indigenous land rights if somehow some political power or positive legal action
had extinguished their title.
If the Himba's indigenous title was somehow extinguished, it has to have been
done by (1) the Germans before 1915; (2) the British between 1915 and 1990; (3)
the South Africans between 1921 and 1990; or (4) the modern Namibian state at
some point after 1990. A parallel colonial process occurred on the Angolan side,
but that colonial history is simpler. In Angola, Portuguese occupation from the
1 6 th Century was the only possible colonial assertion of title. These colonial
assertions of land rights against the indigenous peoples of southern Angola
ultimately fell to the newly independent Angola in 1975. This Article does not
further inquire into the nature of Portuguese or Angolan claims to Himba lands on
the north side of the Kunene River. 154
B. INDIGENOUS LAND RIGHTS
1. Transition to the Recognition of Indigenous Land Rights
As a foundational principal of law, indigenous people must have some kind of
legal right to lands that they live on. ' 55 Before the rise of the modern nation-state,
151. Id.
152. Dams and Development Report, supra note 5, at 102-07.
153. T.W. Bennett & C.H. Powell, Aboriginal Tile in South Africa Revisited, 15 S. AFRICAN J. HuM. RTs.
449,451 (1999).
154. The question of Himba land rights in Angola is an important one, also not dealt with by the Feasibility
Study. Because issues of indigenous title are case and country specific, this requires a careful analysis of
Portuguese colonial dispossession of indigenous land in the Kunene region, as well as of both Portuguese and
Angolan law and post-colonial Angolan political developments on issues of indigenous land rights. While
Kaokoland has never been occupied by European settlers, Portuguese ranches lined the north bank of the
Kunene in the 1960s. These legal developments are not directly related to those in Namibia and it is possible that
different legal conclusions would follow.
155. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 104-07 (1996).
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people occupied land through a wide variety of customary systems, all without
benefit of formal land title, a European innovation, spread around the world
through various colonial legal systems.' 56 Various forms of social organization
with distinct patterns of land occupation developed around the world. Land rights
were based on use and occupation, and these changed through a number of social
processes. There is no need to go back before the original point of colonial
occupation in order to establish Himba land rights. Modern discussions of land
rights begin at the point of indigenous occupation at the time of the first colonial
assertions of domination and control. 57 While historians might quibble about
this date, it is clearly in the range of either the date of the first German political
claim on Kaokoland, 1885, or effective colonial assertion of administrative
authority over Kaokoland, about 1921. Since the Himba were in occupation of
their lands on both dates, this is not at issue.
While there was once, in colonial legal theory, a legal argument that indig-
enous people could not "own" land because of their "primitive" state of social
organization (including their lack of formal legal institutions), this is now
completely rejected in international law and under the common law.' 58 In any
case, this argument is not applicable to the situation of the Himba at Epupa Falls
because no one in Namibia now asserts this position.
The "usufructuary" concept was incorporated into Canadian law from Roman
law in order to define aboriginal title under Canadian law. Essentially, it is an
underlying "use right," subject to the Crown's radical title, but still requiring the
Crown's recognition. In fact, the Crown was legally obligated to purchase this
usufructuary right from its aboriginal title-holders.159 There are also a variety of
positions on the precise nature of the land rights of indigenous peoples. The
English common law refers to these rights as "use rights," a "right of occupancy,"
156. For general information regarding the traditional land tenures in pre-colonial Africa, see Elizabeth
Colson, The Impact of the Colonial Period on the Definition of Land Rights, in COLONIALISM IN AFRICA,
1870-1960, 193-215 (Victor Turner ed., 1971).
157. See KENT McNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL TITLE (1989); see also Bennett, supra note 153, for an
analysis of the doctrine of aboriginal title in relation to South Africa, much of which applies to Namibia as well.
158. In re Southern Rhodesia [1919] AC at 232-234 is an infamous colonial case in which the House of
Lords declared that the Matabele of Zimbabwe are of such "primitive" character that they could not own land.
Various Australian cases held that Australia was "terra nullus," empty land, because the Aboriginal people who
lived there were in such a "primitive" state of social organization that they could not be said to. "own" land.
These doctrines have both been rejected. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara [1975] I.C.J. 12, at 85-86 holds
that, in international law, no land is terra nullus but belongs to its indigenous occupants. Mabo v. State of
Queensland (107 C.L.R. I (1992) is the leading common law case providing a detailed analysis of aboriginal
title. Delgamuukw v. British Columbia [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 (Can.) analyzes the same problem in the Canadian
context.
159. Attorney General of Ontario v. St. Catherine's Milling and Lumber Company (1887) 13 S.C. 577 is the
seminal Canadian case, finding, for the first time, in Canadian law, a usufructurary right for native people. The
case was appealed to the Privy Council of the House of Lords, where this judgment was upheld, making it one of
the most important cases in Commonwealth indigenous land rights. See SIDNEY L. HARRiNG, WHITE MAN'S
LAW: NATIVE PEOPLE IN NINETEENTH CENTURY CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE 125-47 (1998).
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or a "usufructuary right." While these rights have similar meanings, they are not
precisely identical. In general, common law aboriginal title is not seen as an"absolute title," but some lesser land right. It clearly is, however, a right to use the
land forever, reserved to the indigenous occupants of the land and their future
generations. It is a legal title that may be enforced in courts and its loss must be
compensated. Its ultimate value may well be the same as absolute title: a right to
occupy land "forever" is worth almost the same as absolute title.160
2. Failure to Recognize "Aboriginal Title"
The colonial legal theory lives on, however, in the failure of Namibia, like with
most other modem African states, to recognize "aboriginal title." SWAPO, during
the long independence struggle, was influenced by contemporary socialist ideol-
ogy, and came to believe that the state should own the land, as a representative of
the interests of all the people. This perspective makes policy sense in a context
where the alternatives were private ownership by white commercial farmers and
communal land systems, in the hands of traditional chiefs. In the view of the
anti-colonial political movement, both of these forms were inadequate to the
needs of a developing Africa. 1 61 State ownership of the communal lands has been
the dominant model in Africa, with different levels of recognition accorded the
land rights of communal landholders. 162
The problem underlying state ownership of the communal lands is basic to the
problem of decolonizing the racist legal order of Namibia. Although black people
under apartheid did not have access to "land title," white farmers did. The reasons
for this discrimination are basic to the logic of colonialism. By failing to legally
recognize existing black land rights in their communally-held lands, the only
form of land tenure available to them, modem black agricultural regimes are
undermined. Thus, the modem African states preserve existing colonial land
regimes which were designed to give the best land to whites and to force blacks
into the colonial economy as laborers. 163
Virtually all the legally registered land titles in Namibia at the time of
independence were white land titles, primarily for farms and city lots. The South
African state held title to lands used for a wide variety of public uses, such as for
roads, parks, military bases, and wildlife preserves. The Himba, however, lived
on their land for hundreds of years without any need, nor any means, to legally
register their land titles. These land rights were recognized in their own
160. The United States Supreme Court in Worcester v. Georgia 31 U.S. 515 (1832) is an important early
summary the British common law recognition of aboriginal title. See also McNEIL, supra note 151.
161. UNITED NATIONS INSTITUTE FOR NAMIBIA, NAMIBIA: PERSPECTIVES FOR NATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT 133-36 (1966).
162. John W. Bruce, Country Profiles of Land Tenure: Africa, 1996, Research Paper (1998) (reporting on
land tenure in Africa on a country by country basis).
163. THOMAS BIsSETr & DONALD CRUMMY, LAND IN AFRICAN AGRARIAN SYSTEMS 157 (1993).
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customary law and unchallenged by the South African colonial authorities.
Namibian statutory law, however, is silent on questions of aboriginal title. The
government takes the position that Article 100 of the Namibian constitution gives
the state title to the communal lands, but this is not clear on its face.' 64 Therefore,
it is left to judges to "discover" aboriginal title in Namibia either in natural law,
the common law or in international law. A later discussion of aboriginal title in
international law will return to these themes.
C. EXTINGUISHING THE HIMBA LAND RIGHTS
1. German Colonialism in Kaokoland:
Did Germany Extinguish Himba Land Rights?
To begin, German South West Africa was established as protectorate, not as a
colony, a legal distinction that may be of importance. In colonial-era political
theory, a protectorate explicitly recognized the existing indigenous political,
legal, and social order with the dominant power taking these existing polities
under their "protection."' 165 While actual German practice in the settled areas was
more along the model of traditional colonialism, the underlying legal structure of
the "protectorate" remained the practice in northern Namibia. Germany estab-
lished a "protectorate" and also affirmatively recognized indigenous land rights.
Germany took indigenous land for settlement purposes in other parts of
Namibia through a variety of devices, including treaties, individual purchases,
simple occupation, and conquest. 166 German South West Africa was divided into
two distinct legal regions: the colonized area, settled by whites, and the "native"
area, north of the "police line." With one exception, Germany made no claims to
land ownership north of the "police line." In fact, the very meaning of the "police
line" in German colonization meant that Germany enforced no colonial legal
rights beyond this line, restricting its settlers' legal rights to areas within the
policed area. 167 The German claim to the region north of the "police line" was a
political claim of sovereignty, directed against other colonial powers, primarily
the British and Portuguese, who had interests in the region. This claim of political
164. CONSTITUTION OF NAMIBIA, Article 100, available at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/waOOOOO_.html
("Land, water and natural resources below and above the surface of the land... shall belong to the State if they
are not otherwise lawfully owned") (last visited Aug. 10, 2001). Sidney L. Harring, The Constitution of Namibia
and the 'Rights and Freedoms' Guaranteed Communal Land Holders: Resolving the Inconsistency Between
Article 16, Article 100, and Schedule 5, 12 S AFRICAN J. HUM. RTS. 467 (1996).
165. MALCOLM SHAw, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA 46-48 (1986).
166. There is no complete history of German land occupation in South West Africa, although all of the
standard historical works devote some attention to the subject. This became an administrative problem for
British and South African officials during the mandate. A report, Land Tenure Under German Government in
South West Africa, written by A.N. Rowan, Register of Deeds, Windhoek, 1924, held in the Namibian National
Archives, discusses the various types of land titles held by German settlers (on file with author).
167. FIRST, supra note 43, at 121-128.
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sovereignty included the whole of Kaokoland, all of the land now occupied by the
Himba.
Beyond this, there apparently were only a handful of German exploration
parties that even traveled in Kaokoland during the entire thirty-year German
colonial period. None of these ever claimed any land under German law, and
there was never any German occupation, use, or regulation of the local people or
their land. 16 8 Thus, there is no basis to argue that Germany extinguished
indigenous land rights anywhere in Kaokoland, including the Himba's. Such an
extinguishment cannot occur by accident, or by mere travel; it must be a direct
extinguishment under positive law. 169
The one possible German claim involves the mining and land rights of the
Kaokoland Development Company. Their claim is best described as something
between a venture in land and mineral speculation and outright fraud, and is
easily dismissed; these German land and mineral rights were legally challenged
by British investors in the 1920s and the claim was abandoned. It was never
recognized by British and South African courts or political authorities, hence
cannot possibly now be relied on to diminish Himba land rights. 170 This might be
the end of consideration of this title, but since this was the only German claim to
Kaokoland, it requires some further analysis because it illuminates a good deal
about the nature of German colonial land titles and colonial era treaties.
Adolph Luderitz, the merchant who founded German South West Africa, made
a number of personal treaties with various chiefs up and down the Atlantic Coast.
In the late 1880s, Luderitz purportedly purchased Kaokoland through a treaty
with a Nama chief. The Omaruru Herero, claiming that the land was Herero land
and therefore could not be sold by any Nama chief, immediately contested this
claim.1 7 ' This shows that the legal question of land rights based on the Luderitz
treaties was immediately raised under German colonial law, although it was
never conclusively resolved.
German colonial authorities gave a great deal of credence to this Herero claim.
However, as long as no Germans settled Kaokoland, they never had to resolve the
issue.1 7 2 Later, the Herero were held to have "forfeited" most of their lands in
168. Bollig, Colonial Encapsulation, supra note 14.
169. This point is well established in international law, distinguishing a claim of political sovereignty from a
claim of land rights. The best discussion of this is in Mabo v. State of Queensland, supra note 158.
170. "Report on the Land and Mining Titles in South West Africa Claimed by the Deutsche Kolonial
Gessellslchaft fuer Sued-West Afrika," (no author, no date) Namibian National Archives, BB 0133 (copy on file
with author).
171. See HORST DRECHSLER, LET Us DIE FIGHTING: THE STRUGGLE OF THE HERERO AND NAMA AGAINST
GERMAN IMPERIALISM (1884-1915) (1966). This land was not Herero land, but Himba land. It is not clear
whether this Herero claim was lodged on behalf of the Himba, or was as speculative as the Nama claim.
172. Report on the Land and Mining Titles in South West Africa, supra note 170, at 16-18. This typewritten
document, apparently a memorandum of law, running to several hundred pages, appears to have been produced
in the 1920s as part of a British and South African effort to resolve the remaining land title issues connected to
German colonial occupation.
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central Namibia in the Herero war but, again, none of the war was fought over the
lands in Kaokoland, and no German ever maintained that any of Kaokoland was
"forfeited" in the Herero war. In fact, the Herero who fled to Kaokoland after the
war were left alone for the remaining years of German colonial occupation.
Luderitz, who sold the company the "land rights" he had acquired from various
Nama chiefs, incorporated the Deutsche Kolonial Gesellschaft fuer Sued-West
Afrika (DKG), and this company was legal successor to whatever land rights
Luderitz had claimed.' 73 Held by both British and German capital, the company
was primarily formed to speculate in the mineral resources of Namibia. This was
the era of the vast expansion of the gold and diamond mines of South Africa, and
there was reason for Europeans to believe that Namibia had the same kind of
wealth.' 74 Most of the actual white settlement and agricultural development
followed by another decade, after the end of the Herero War in 1905.
The Kaokoland Mining Company was divested from the DKG in the 1890s
and acquired the DKG's "land and mining rights" in Kaokoland. Its activities
were limited to three exploration expeditions to Kaokoland and it never did any
actual mining. 175 The company's land title was never clear because that depended
on the validity of the "sale" of most of Kaokoland to Luderitz in 1885.176 The
Luderitz claim covered a strip of Atlantic Coast as far north as the Portuguese
boundary, although that boundary had not yet been finally determined because
neither Germany nor Portugal had actually explored that area.
Luderitz's land also extended along the coast, from north to south the length of
South West Africa and inland for "twenty geographical miles". t77 Because this
strip, the "Skeleton Coast", is almost entirely without water and is therefore
worthless for herding or crop production, the Nama readily agreed to sell it. The
DKG, however, later claimed that these treaties ceded land to a depth of "twenty
old German miles", an archaic and largely unused unit of measurement equal to
173. J.H. ESTERHUYSE, SOUTH WEST AFRICA, 1880-1894: THE ESTABLISHMENT OF GERMAN AUTHORITY IN
SOUTH WEST AFRICA 88-97 (1968).
174. Report on the Land and Mining Titles in South West Africa, supra note 170.
175. Id. at Appendix B, p 9-11. "The Kaokofeld is now claimed by the daughter Company of the Deutsche
Koloniale Gessellschaft, the Kaoko - Land and Mines Company, but the validity of the present claimants' title
depends entirely on the validity of the original [title]." The Kaokoland Mining Company was simply a successor
syndicate of mining speculators.
176. Id. These two claims are discussed in detail at 51-70. Ahand drawn map representing the extent of these
land sales in Kaokoland appears after p. 61.
177. The first of these treaties, dated August 25, 1883, reads as follows:
"[o]n this, the 25th August 1883 Captain Joseph Frederiks of Bethany has sold to the firm of F.A.B.
Luderitz of Bremen in Germany a certain portion of his territory - to wit" the whole coast from the
mount of the Groot - or Orange - River as far as the 26th degree of Southern Latitude, including all
bays and Harbours together with the land lying 20 (twenty) geographical miles inland from each and
every point of the coast line - in consideration of which shall be paid: 60 (sixty) Westley-Richard rifles
and L500 (five hundred pounds) in gold.
Report on the Land and Mining Titles in South West Africa, supra note 170, at 24.
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about four conventional "British" miles. This meant that the Company claimed
about four times the land that the Nama believed that they sold including a great
deal of arable land. Neither the Nama, nor the British, recognized this claim,
seeing it, instead, as evidence of German fraud and dishonesty.' 78 Ironically,
there is evidence that even the German government saw the Company's claims as
fraudulent, but needed the pretext of these claims to support their colonial
intervention into Namibia. 179 The Kaokoland claims were even less defined.
While the Nama launched regular cattle raids into Kaokoland, they never lived
there. It was the Himba, Tjimba, and Herero who lived there although, as
semi-nomadic peoples they both moved regularly and also regularly retreated to
the north to escape from Nama raids.' 80
The chaotic state of the land rights in question in the period immediately
before German colonization is clear. During the 1860s and 1870s Topnaar and
Herero fought over much of the territory, with the actual occupation of particular
lands being traded back and forth. By the early 1880s the Herero took the upper
hand, actually driving the Topnaar back to British protection in Walvis Bay in
1882 and occupying Sesfontein. Thus, three years before the Sesfontein Topnaar
sold Kaokoland to Ludertiz they didn't even occupy their own lands, having
temporarily lost them to the Herero. 1 81
Other circumstances of these "treaties," such as the extremely low price of the
land in question, raise basic questions of their legality. The Nama chiefs
essentially sold all of their land for an extremely small amount of money. Neither
chief spoke English, the language of the treaty, so it is not clear that either
actually understood what the treaty documents they signed said. Later docu-
ments, not a part of the original treaties, claimed that the Nama owned lands as
far east as Waterberg, and as far north as Angola, statements that were clearly
false, raising questions about who was defrauding whom.' 82 On one hand, the
Germans had an interest in broad purchases of vast quantities of land in order to
politically justify their protectorate, and to pre-empt British mining and territorial
claims. On the other hand, opportunistic petty chiefs also had an interest in
selling land they didn't own for quick cash. One British suggestion is that this
was a case of mutual fraud, deliberately engaged in for the benefit of both sides.
In any case, the process was probably illegal and fraudulent.
178. Id., at 25-26. The Nama, many of whom had moved north from the Cape Colony, had a familiarity with
British measurements, but there was no accepted meaning for the term "geographical mile" used in Luderitz'
treaties, and interpreted by the Germans as the "old German mile." In common use was the standard mile of
5,280 feet, and the nautical mile, about 1.15% of a standard mile, two usages that were so close that they would
have made little difference on the ground in tribal Africa. One view, put forward by the British, is that Luderitz
simply intended to defraud the Nama of their land by confusing them with this unknown measurement.
179. GEWALD, supra note 20, at 31.
180. Michael Bollig, Contested Places, supra note 34.
181. Report on the Land and Mining Titles in South West Africa, supra note 170, at 53-61.
182. Id.
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Manasse, a Herero chief at Omaruru, immediately objected to the Sesfontein
treaty, claiming both that the Topnaar did not own that land, and that it was
Herero land, containing water holes and grazing areas used by Herero cattle.
Manasse argued that the lands the Topnaar claimed had always been Herero and
had never been the object of any war, that the Topnaar had never conquered the
lands. 183 Manasse then pointed out that since the Herero were under the
protection of the Germans, it was their duty to protect his lands from the
Topnaar. 184 Manasse offered one final legal argument-he accused the two chiefs
who sold the land of being "thieves" for selling his land, and he accused Luderitz
of being a "thief" for purchasing stolen lands from them. 85
While the Himba do not directly figure into Manasse's claim, the Himba at this
time were understood to be Herero, occupying Herero lands, and Manasse
probably included them in his own history of the conflict. They were "poor
relatives," the literal meaning of "Himba" in the Herero language, under the
protection of their Herero tribesmen. The Himba lived in Kaokoland, together
with the Herero. Many had retreated to Angola, others were hidden in remote
mountain valleys, and others had fled to more powerful Herero clans. The Himba
were dispersed but in the process of forming a distinct tribal identity at this
time. 86 In any case, this dispute clearly shows that both the Nama and the Herero
believed that they owned their lands in the 1880s, with both asserting claims of
ownership against the Germans. Manasse even asserted his right to German"protection" of his land rights against the Nama, an assertion of his indigenous
land rights under German colonial authority.
The British and South Africans, following the defeat of Germany in 1915, did
not legally recognize the land claims of these German syndicates. They dismissed
Ludertiz's land titles as frauds, based on both his misrepresentation, poor
physical description of the lands being acquired, as well as on the exaggerated
claims of the Nama chiefs he bought the land from, often selling worthless lands
that they had no claim to. A British report analogized the situation to a Nama
chief selling the Cape of Good Hope to the Germans, forcing the British residents
there to defend against a German land title. 187 At the same time, the land titles of
the German farmers in central Namibia were recognized, as required, under
international law. It was well accepted among European peoples that the property
rights of individuals had to be respected when territory changed hands after acts
of conquest.1 88 The vicious German wars against Namibia's people were "legal".
183. ESTERHUYSE, supra note 173, at 112-13.
184. Report on the Land and Mining Titles in South West Africa, supra note 170, at 18.
185. Id. at 20.
186. Bollig, Colonial Encapsulation, supra note 14.
187. Report on the Land and Mining Titles in South West Africa, supra note 170, at 3.
188. SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE ACQUISITION OF INTERNATIONAL TERRrrORY BY FORCE
IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE (1996).
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in the colonial-era international law of that time, and the violent dispossession of
the Herero and Nama had the effect of vacating their lands, leaving them open to
settlement under German law. But Himba lands were not seized by the Germans,
and were not opened up to white settlement. The Himba remained there under
their "protectorate" status.
This was the end of German land claims in Kaokoland. However, under
German law, mining rights and surface land rights were entirely separate matters.
Thus, these companies did not need to entertain claims to the land surface. Desert
lands that were largely unusable for agriculture had never really been at stake in
the Kaokoland land claims. Rather, the German and British speculators were
following in the footsteps of Rhodes, holding the promise of vast mineral and
diamond deposits to attract additional investors. When no significant mineral
deposits were found in Kaokoland, the mining rights claims came to have no
value, effectively ending the matter.
In sum, the Kaokoland Mining Company was an international syndicate of
mining speculators that never took any concrete form in Kaokoland, held a
dubious land title, never occupied any land, and never displaced any Himba
people. What "title" the company held was based on two Nama treaties of
doubtful legality, applying arguably to only a few parts of Kaokoland actually
under the control of the Sesfontein Topnaar, which did not extend to northern
Kaokoland and Epupa, the heart of Himba country. More importantly, this land
title was never legally recognized by Britain or South Africa. Indeed, it is not
even clear that German authorities prior to 1915 recognized the title, because the
area was completely beyond the reach of the colonial legal system. German
occupation was, by all accounts, "hardly noticed" in Kaokoland. Nothing in
German occupation of Kaokoland leads to the conclusion that Germany took a
land title from the native inhabitants. Their lands, therefore, were still held by
them at the time of British (and South African) occupation.
2. British Occupation of Namibia and the League of Nations Mandate,
1915-1921
The question of British colonial influence on Himba land rights may seem so
irrelevant that it does not require discussion. The whole mythology of the South
African Mandate is that it was South African, and not British. However, great
legal significance flows from the assertion of British colonial law in Namibia. 189
The British Empire took South West Africa from the Germans in 1915. The
British kept the German colony, but administered it through South Africa under
the League of Nations Mandate for both political and administrative conve-
nience. The Mandate was conferred upon "his Britannic Majesty to be exercised
189. ALLAN D. COOPER, THE OCCUPATION OF NAMIBIA: AFRIKANERDOM'S ATTACK ON THE BRITISH EMPIRE 1-5
(1991).
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on his behalf by the Government of the Union of South Africa.' ' 90 This meant
that South African domestic law applied in Namibia, subject to the will of British
Parliament and the House of Lords, which was the highest court and the final
authority on South African law. But, in plain language, it was the King of Great
Britain who held the Mandate, trusting South Africa to administer its domestic
matters on behalf of the Crown, the ruler of the British Empire.
The British, by 1920, had a great deal of experience with colonial rule, and
ordinarily engaged in political negotiations with indigenous people when purchas-
ing land for white settlement. As one of their few acts as rulers of Namibia,
British colonial authorities issued a famous report.1 9' This tract is a bitter
denunciation of German colonial rule, complete with numerous photographs of
tortured black people. Its purpose was to clear the way for a more humane and
liberal British colonial rule, through its South African government. The forcible
dispossession of native people from their lands by the German army and the
violence German farmers visited upon their laborers were central themes to the
report.
Still, the new colonial government of South West Africa was bound, under
international law, to recognize existing German land titles. While the lands of
native peoples could be seized and permanently alienated by "right of conquest,"
European countries were bound to recognize the land rights of "Christian"
peoples.1 92 Therefore, Britain and South Africa were required to recognize
legally established German South West Africa colonial era land titles. This gave
rise to some confusion in the 1920s as many people claimed land under dubious
German titles. 193
A large number of farms remained in the hands of their German owners, who
had acquired a legal title under German colonial law, although no such land titles
existed in Kaokoland. Therefore, while the British and South Africans took some
measure of political sovereignty over Namibia, they did not take actual land title
beyond the title actually held by the German government. Rather, the British took
the colony subject to existing land rights, including both the land titles of the
white settlers and the traditional rights to the communal lands held by black
inhabitants. This is the classic distinction between the Crown's "radical" title, the
190. ROBERT LovE BRAUM, SOUTH WEST AFRICA UNDER MANDATE 22 (1976).
191. Administrator's Office, Windhoek, REPORT ON THE NATIVES OF SOUTH WEST AFRICA AND THEIR
TREATMENT BY GERMANY (1918) (on file with author).
192. KORMAN, supra note 188. See also M.F. LINDLEY, THE ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD
TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 316 (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969; orig. 1926) ("Rights of
private property, including land and concessions, which foreigners have acquired in backward territory, remain
unimpaired when the territory passes under the sovereignty of an advanced state.").
193. This apparently is the purpose of the report by A.N. Rowan, Register of Deeds at Windhoek, "Land
Tenure Under German Government in South West Africa," 1924. While, after 1915, many Germans were either
expelled by British authorities or voluntarily left, their land titles often wound up in the hands of British or
South Africans, who sought to have these titles recognized under the new colonial regime.
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ultimate political sovereignty over the land, and the right of occupants or owners
to continue to use land that they actually enjoyed the use of. This distinction is
basic to European land law, tracing back to feudalism. 194
At this point, for a second time, the law of the German protectorate applies.
While the Herero and Nama went to war with Germany and had their protected
status terminated, losing their lands to conquest, the Himba and other peoples of
the north did not. 195 They lived north of the police line, peacefully under German"protection," under their own law and their own chiefs, beyond the reach of
German law. The British and South African Mandate was applied to this political
and legal structure.
The whole scheme of early to mid- twentieth century British colonial law
applies to Namibia. This may be important to note because during this period, the
British common law carved out, primarily in North America and the Pacific, an
extensive jurisprudence of indigenous land rights that has never been applied in
Africa. While the British assigned their Mandate to South Africa, they did this as
an imperial power, designating the administration of South West Africa to a
colony on its behalf. 196 Therefore, it is both the common law and South African
law that applies to the land rights of the Namibian people during the period of the
Mandate, 1921 to 1990. This point will be returned to after a discussion of the
South African rule of Namibia under the Mandate.
It may seem anomalous that the House of Lords was the highest legal authority,
theoretically reviewing Roman Dutch law, but this was established law in a
Commonwealth with a long history of the absorption of distinct peoples and their
laws. The "common law" of the British Empire was never simply "British law,"
but an evolving law, looking carefully to the local law, and the legal history of a
particular people, and applying the broad and flexible principles of the British
common law. This common law was the law of Namibia through the mandatory
period, until independence in 1990, and is therefore a part of Namibia's legal
heritage. The impact of South African law must be understood in this context.
3. South African Law in Namibia:
Diminishing "Native" Land Rights by Statute
There can be no question that South African law diminished indigenous
peoples rights, including land rights, in Namibia during the years of South
African occupation. The first inquiry is to what extent those legal actions
impacted on indigenous land rights, including those of the Himba, in Kaokoland.
194. MCNEIL, supra note 151. The theory behind the concept that the Crown always holds an underlying title
to the land within its sovereignty: all land is held subject to the power and will of the sovereign, with an army, a
power to tax, and a power of eminent domain.
195. GEWALD, supra note 20, at 191.
196. See generally COOPER, supra note 189.
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If Himba land rights survived the German colonial era, the question was whether
South African positive law extinguished their indigenous land title. Assuming
South African law diminished these indigenous peoples' land rights, the next
question is whether these laws and legal actions still control Namibian law. It
seems clear that much of the apartheid era action that South Africa took in
Namibia was "illegal" in that it violated the League of Nations Mandate. At the
same time, South Africa enjoyed, under Article 2 of the Mandate, "full power of
administration and legislation over the territory," a clear and unambiguous
granting of power. 197
Therefore, the task here is to both analyze the nature and legal basis of South African
legal control over the indigenous peoples of Namibia, and then the legality under
international law of those relationships that governed the League of Nations' Mandate.
At independence, the Namibian government took all South African government owned
land in Namibia. Although German and British land rights in Kaokoland are relatively
easy to dispose of because neither country ever claimed land ownership, as distinct
from political sovereignty, over the local population, that is not true of South Africa.
The South African colonial government had a distinct racist agenda regarding "native"
rights in South Africa and, for the most part, extended that regime to Namibia, thereby
affecting the underlying legal title that the indigenous people of Namibia held in their
traditional lands.
The basic South African system for holding and administering "native" lands
was through the "reserve system." While some traditional lands were expropri-
ated and turned over to Afrikaner farmers, most of these communal lands were
legally constituted as reserves. These lands were declared "trust lands" by statute,
the first formal claim in Namibia of European ownership of traditional lands.
These lands were legally held in trust "for the benefit" of the native population of
Namibia by the South African state. 1 98
The South African agenda for Namibia, however, was not limited to creating
native reserves. Namibia was to be completely incorporated into South Africa.
The indigenous people of Namibia had value only in relationship to the booming
South African economy. The reserve system was designed to support a vast
reserve labor force, able to travel thousands of miles to work in the mines or in
agriculture. Just as some of these mines became Namibian mines, some of the
agriculture became Namibian agriculture. South Africa, by the 1920s, was a fully
settled agricultural nation. Namibia offered cheap new lands for Afrikaner
settlers and, with government subsidies, thousands of poor whites resettled to the
very borders of Kaokoland.' 99 Thus, Namibia became a de facto extension of
South Africa, politically, legally, and economically.
197. Mandate for South West Africa, Article 2. See BRAUM, supra note 190. This volume is a compilation of
various documents relative to the South West Africa mandate.
198. Harring, supra note 164.
199. See COOPER, supra note 189.
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The full legal history of South Africa's administration of Namibia is still being
written, and a number of issues, including whether South Africa even had the
legal right under the Mandate to seize native property and convert it to its own
use, are unresolved. While these arguments are important, this analysis actually
turns on the legal status of the communal lands under South African rule. South
West Africa became a protectorate of South Africa in the Treaty of Versailles of
June 28, 1919. The Mandate for South West Africa published under this treaty
was signed in December 1920 and published on June 6, 1921. The Administration
of Justice Proclamation of 1919 extended South African Roman Dutch law to
Namibia, including land law.20 0 While South Africa generally administered
Namibia as its "fifth province," there were always legal distinctions between
South Africa and its League of Nations Mandate territory, and South West Africa
never fully became a part of South Africa.
The Native Reserves Trust Funds Administration Proclamation of 1924,
extended and refined by the Native Trust and Land Act of 1936, is the foundation
of the current Namibian argument that the state "owns" native land.2 0 ' These
statutes both asserted that the South African state holds legal title to native"reserve" land and required that those lands be held in trust for the benefit of the
native people. 2 Various amendments to this law occurred over the years, and the
1954 South West African Native Affairs Administration Act provided that land
reserved for natives was "vested" in the South African Development Trust, which
had been established by the Native Development Trust and Land Act of 1936.2o3
This is a statutory declaration that the communal lands of Namibia were "vested"
in the South African Development Trust as of 1954. The "Trust" was, in turn,
under the "ownership" and control of the South African state. 2° Following this
logic, it is a simple matter of positive law that the land title of the Himba lands
passed to the Government of South Africa in 1954, then to the Government of
Namibia in 1990 under the Constitution of Namibia, which clearly purports to
transfer to the Namibian government all lands held by the various native trusts
200. LEGAL ASSISTANCE CENTRE, NAMLEX: INDEX TO THE LAWS OF NAMIBIA 6 (1998).
201. Schedule 5 of the Constitution of Namibia states that South African state property "vests" in
Government of Namibia at independence, then goes on, in detail, to list some of the categories of this property.
This is, obviously, the other half of the argument that Article 100 confers title to the communal lands on the
Namibian state. If the communal lands are "otherwise not lawfully owned" they fall to the Namibian
government under Article 100. If these lands were "owned" by the South African state and conveyed under
Schedule 5, then the Namibian state already owns them. Neither of these positions satisfactorily disposes of this
issue: it is a question of the land rights of 44% of the population of Namibia and should be directly addressed
under Namibian, not South African, law. CONSTITUTION OF NAMIBIA, available at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/
law/wa00000_.html (last visited Aug. 10, 2001).
202. Native Reserves Trust Funds Administration Proclamation 9 of 1924; Native Trust and Land Act
(1936).
203. Harring, supra note 164, at 480.
204. THE RIGHT TO THE LAND 44-46 (T.R.H. Davenport and K.S. Hunt eds., 1974).
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and homeland authorities.2 °5
But there are at least two arguments that the Himba lands did not pass to the
Namibian government. The first is because the government of South Africa didn't
actually "own" these lands. Rather, some legal right to administer these lands
passed to the state, but only in its capacity as administrator of a trust. The Native
Trust Administration, in fact, is the actual holder of the land title, holding it for
the benefit of its occupants; in this case, the Himba. Through this circle, there was
never any intent on the part of the South African state to take title to Himba
communal lands. Rather, the intent was primarily racist, to keep black people and
white people separated, and to establish an administrative trust to effectively
administer apartheid era racial policies of increasing complexity in the middle ofthe twentieth century.26 While the trust technically "owns" the land in the sense
that it has a statutory title, it has no right to dispose of it except for the direct
benefit of the Himba. As a pastoral people, the Himba have no reason to ever
dispose of their land-and the land, in fact, has not only never been disposed of,
but is still entirely in Himba hands. Thus, it cannot be said that the Himba have
ever lost "title" to their land through this legal device.20 7
Trust doctrine is complex, and is applied to Native lands in a number of
countries, including the United States and Canada.2°8 While the "trust" holds
legal title to the land, it holds it subject to such extensive indigenous rights that it
cannot dispose or diminish the title in any significant way. Put in the context of
modern trust doctrine, if the beneficiaries of a trust bring a legal action to restore
205. CONsTITUTION OF NAMIBIA, Schedule 5, available at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/wa00000_.html
(last visited Aug. 10, 2001). "(1) All property of which the ownership or control immediately prior to the date of
Independence vested in the Government of the Territory of South West Africa, or in any Representative
Authority constituted in terms of the Representative Authorities Proclamation, 1989 (Proclamation AG8 of
1980).... or in any other body, statutory or otherwise, constituted by or for the benefit of any such Government
or Authority immediately prior to the date of Independence, or which was held in trust for or on behalf of the
Government of an independent Namibia, shall vest in or be under the control of the Government of Namibia. (2)
For the purpose of this Schedule, 'property' shall, without detracting from the generality of that term as
generally accepted and understood, mean and include movable and immovable property, whether corporeal or
incorporeal and wheresoever situate, and shall include any right or interest therein." Id.
206. A.J. CHRISTOPHER, THE ATLAS OF APARTHEID 32-35 (1994). The system of apartheid was geographical:
separate areas were designated for whites, blacks, and other races. The system required a legal power to
administer those geographical relationships and the Native Trust concept had that capacity. It gave the South
African state absolute political and legal control of Native land. But that 1936 purpose is not necessarily "legal
title" in year 2000 law.
207. Another way to make this point is direct through the analogy of a simple trust: Father leaves Daughter a
million acre farm through a trust, which administers the farm "for her benefit." While the trust might actually
hold the title to the farm, in every sense it "belongs" to Daughter. Should the trust breach its duty, for example by
giving away the farm, Daughter's remedy is to sue for breach of trust, asking that her lands be restored, even
asking that the trust be terminated and the lands revert to her, the lawful beneficiary of the trust. The common
law provides a full range of equitable remedies in such situations. There is also a long tradition in the common
law of judicially terminating or modifying trusts that violate public policy, for example, trusts that serve racist
ends.
208. See Mary Christina Wood, Indian Land and the Promise of Native Sovereignty: The Trust Doctrine
Revisited, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 1471.
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their lands because the "trustees" have breached their duty, they have clear
property rights independent of the legal status of the trust. The court then has a
number of legal remedies available, including terminating or modifying the trust
and vesting title in its beneficiaries. This is especially true if the original trust is
the racist product of the colonial era and in violation of modern public policy.
But this isn't the end of the issue of the "ownership" of the communal lands of
Namibia. Even if the 1954 Native Trust is somehow still legal, a racist abomina-
tion in twenty-first century Namibia, the Government of Namibia did not
necessarily take an unrestricted title to the communal lands. Rather, it took a title
fully subject to the obligations of the trust that, in turn, hold the lands for the
benefit of the traditional holders of the communal lands. Under this theory, while
the Government of Namibia may have some kind of title, it is subject to such
extensive underlying Himba rights to use their land that the government's title is
essentially meaningless because it cannot dispose of the land without harming the
Himba. Flooding the land upstream from the Epupa Dam and forcibly removing
the Himba breaches that trust, subjecting the Namibian government to extensive
claims for damages, both for the loss of the land and for the residual damages that
follow from the loss of the land, including damage to their culture.
The second argument that the South African Development Trust did not pass
title to the communal lands turns not on trust doctrine, but more broadly on the
nature of the 1920 League of Nations Mandate. South Africa did not acquire
absolute and unfettered control of South West Africa; rather, it took control of
domestic administration subject to both a legal mandate and international law.
The legal mandate required that South Africa administer to South West Africa
"for the benefit" of the peoples who lived there. Article 2 clearly states: "The
Mandatory shall promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the
social progress of the inhabitants of the territory. '20 9 The apartheid legal regime
that was imposed in Namibia was declared illegal by the United Nations, the
relevant political and legal authority, because it broke the terms of the Mandate.
This led to the United Nations General Assembly Resolution revoking the
Mandate, which would appear to invalidate any South African laws passed after
1966 applying to Namibia. 210 Moreover, South Africa, by the terms of the
Mandate in Article 7, agreed to the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of
International Justice "if any dispute whatever should arise between the Manda-
tory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or
209. League of Nations, Mandate for South West Africa, Geneva, Dec. 17. 1920, Article 2 reprinted in
BRAUM, supra note 190.
210. General Assembly Resolution 2145 (XXI), 1966. Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) declares that
"the continued South African presence in Namibia is illegal and consequently that all of South Africa's acts and
legislation concerning Namibia were null and void." GINO NALDI, CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN NAMIBIA: A
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS WITH INTERNATIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS 4 (1995). This would appear to include much
of the legislation imposing the Odendall Plan, the imposition of black homelands in Namibia.
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application of the provisions of the Mandate., 21t This provision, which would
have forbidden the application of all apartheid era laws in Namibia, including the
land laws, had it been honored, also renders these laws in violation of the
Mandate.
The South Africans took immediate administrative control of the native lands
in the North in 1921 through a resident commissioner, C.H.L. "Cocky" Hahn,
who governed Ovamboland, but early on had jurisdiction over Kaokoland. Hahn
governed from 1921 through 1946, the period in which Kaokoland went from
being almost inaccessible to having an administrative center, Opuwo, and a
settlement located around an airstrip designed to refuel flights from South Africa
to Angola.212 But, this administrative control was always through the local chiefs,
with these administrators never claiming "title" to native land.
Hahn's mission was to reduce the Ovambo and other northern Namibian
peoples to a state of dependency, creating a willing labor force for South Africa.
He did this in Ovamboland, but failed in Kaokoland. Basically, Kaokoland was
much more remote and much less populated, permitting the people there,
particularly the Himba, to carry on their tradition herding practices and creating
an alternative local economy vibrant enough so that the Himba did not need to
become migrant laborers.213 The Ovamboland economy, however, was soon
destroyed by overpopulation and drought. In addition, the greater population
density of Ovamboland made it more economical for the South Africans to more
tightly administer it, putting more effort into forcing the Ovambo into migrant
labor.214
In any case, both Kaokoland and Ovamboland were legally constituted as"reserves," although Kaokoland was never brought under South African author-
ity to the same extent as Ovamboland. Kaokoland was gazetted as the reserve of
three tribes, the Himba, the Herero, and the Tjimba. Later, it was reduced in size
as a "native reserve" and the surplus land (land in southern Kaokoland, not
occupied by the Himba and therefore irrelevant here) legally protected as a game
reserve.215
The issue remaining is whether the South African action of creating a "native
reserve" for the Himba in Kaokoland results in South Africa taking legal title to
the Himba lands through the statute creating that reserve, and related statutes
defining the legal status of native reserves. The simplest view of those statutes is
that they never asserted any "ownership" right to native lands and instead
211. General Assembly Resolution, id., at Article 7.
212. PATRICIA HAYES ET AL., THE COLONISING CAMERA: PHOTOGRAPHS IN THE MAKING OF NAMIBIAN HISTORY
171-81 (1998).
213. Bollig, Colonial Encapsulation, supra note 14.
214. Id.
215. G.L. Owen-Smith, Proposals for a Game Reserve in the Western Kaokoveld, S. AFRICAN J. SC.,
February 1972, 29-37.
[Vol. 14:35
THE OVAHIMBA AND THE EPUPA DAM
"reserved" native people their own lands. There is an extensive and complex law
of "reserves" in the common law world that does not fully answer the question of
land title.21 6 The "reserves" designated land rights for native people, essentially
guaranteeing basic rights to lands that had traditionally been theirs. Thus, the act
of "reserving" native land implicitly recognized the underlying native title. The
issue, nevertheless, is very difficult and here the analogous cases from North
America do not fit the Namibian and South African situation.21 7
While it is clear that the South African state exercised some limited dominion
over native reserves in the form of administrative centers and army bases, the
fundamental ownership and use of the land did not change. Even if South Africa
asserted that the state "owned" the lands, this ownership is not inconsistent with
native property rights. It is analogous to European property traditions in which
the King owns an underlying interest in the land while individuals, lord or
peasant, own the land itself for all intents and purposes, but are still subject to the
King's underlying property rights.
4. The Namibian Government's "Ownership" of the Communal Lands:
South Africa's "Land Title" Inherited
The modem irony underlying the Namibian government's policy over the
communal lands is that it is based on the racist, apartheid era reserve policy of
South Africa. In independence, however, Namibia took "title" to all South
African property located in Namibia, including all forms of real property.2 1 8
Thus, if the communal lands of the various Namibian native peoples were, in fact,
South African state land, the Namibian government took title. If, on the other
hand, these lands were not owned by South Africa, the Namibian government did
not take title, and Namibia's claim to legal title of the communal lands is
216. Most of this law is from the United States and Canada, which operate hundreds of "reserves" for
Indians. The basic land law of these reserves is complex, but is probably best summarized as the government
claims underlying land ownership, but cannot alienate it without the payment of its full value in compensation.
This is a de facto recognition of tribal ownership: the tribe is entitled to the full value of the land as payment for
alienation, not some portion. For a in-depth source on the legal status of reservations in the United States, see
FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1982. The law is much more unsettled in Canada. Guerin v.
The Queen [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335 involves Indian reserve lands leased to a golf club. The Supreme Court of
Canada, without specifying exactly what the land tenure rights of the Musqueam Nation are, concludes that
Canada has a fiduciary duty to secure those lands for the benefit of band members. Dozens of "land claims" are
currently being posed in Canada, in which aboriginal nations secure substantial rights to lands through
assertions of "aboriginal title."
217. The "native reserve" is a common institution in British colonial policy, appearing around the world, in
its ordinary meaning "reserving" to indigenous peoples some parts of their own traditional lands. In this sense
"reserved" lands are often traditionally held native lands, never alienated by colonial powers.
218. Article 100, CONSTITUTION OF NAMIBIA., available at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/aw/waOOOOO-.html
(last visited Aug. 10, 2001) ("Land, water, and natural resources below and above the surface of the land and in
the continental shelf and within the territorial waters and the exclusive economic zone of Namibia shall belong
to the State if they are not otherwise lawfully owned."). Id.
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completely derivative. Because it assumes it has title to the communal lands, the
Namibian government has done nothing to alter this legal relationship since
independence. 21 9 The analysis is not so simple because it is not obvious whether
South Africa ever held "state ownership" of the communal lands.
By any standard, the unilateral seizure of the legal title to the communal lands
of black people by the white South African state, a racist, apartheid era measure,
cannot be said to "benefit" the people of Namibia. Nor can confining almost all of
the black population of Namibia to first the "reserves," then to the "homelands"
north of the police line. Accordingly, it was an illegal seizure of native title and
should not be recognized by current Namibian, South African, or international
law. Where conflicting interests occur, for example when whites occupy lands
that were seized from blacks, there may be a legal need to mediate between
conflicting claims, but no such problem exists in the former "native reserves"
now present within Namibia. The people who now live on the land have lived
there for lengthy periods of time; it is "their land," owned communally as it
always has been. Following this logic, the Himba have owned their land for about
two hundred and fifty years and continue to own it in spite of South Africa's
illegal, apartheid-era, claim of state "ownership."
If South Africa did not "own" indigenous lands, holding a legal title, then it
could not transfer "ownership" to Namibia under Article 100 of its Constitution,
which only conveys lands "not otherwise owned." This would be in direct
contravention of Article 16 of the Constitution of Namibia, providing that "all
persons shall have the right in any part of Namibia to acquire, own and dispose of
all forms of immovable and moveable property." This was clearly intended to
guarantee a wide variety of property rights, not just private property held in fee
simple. In fact, the plain meaning of the term "all" forms of property must refer to
all forms of property known to the makers of the Namibian constitution in
1989-90, when communal land holders held about 40% of the land in Namibia.
Similarly, the idea that "all" persons referred only to white people and their
property rights is both impossible and also politically and legally untenable. To
hold otherwise means that the Namibian constitution protects white private
property but not black communal property, a racist proposition, inconsistent with
the spirit of the rest of the Constitution.22 °
Obviously, for administrative purposes, some governmental or parastatal agency
might, in fact, hold some kind administrative power over the communal lands, but that
right would be held subject to very clear formal requirements that the land be held for
219. After independence some other African states, presumably with less constitutional protection of private
property rights, passed statutes asserting state ownership of their communal lands. While such a statute might
appear to resolve some of the uncertainty in Namibia, it would also run the risk of contravening Article 16,
recognizing all forms of property rights.
220. CONSTITUTION OF NAMIBIA, Article 16, available at http://www.uni-wuerzburg.de/law/waOOOOO_.html
(last visited Aug. 10, 2001). The argument that follows is drawn from Harring, supra note 164.
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the benefit of the communal landholders. This, in fact, is the most common legal status
of communal lands in Africa. While the state ordinarily claims formal title to the
communal lands, the communal landholders enjoy a high level of security of tenure
because the state usually de facto recognizes an indigenous title to the communal
lands.22 ' This system works as long as the state defers to traditional authorities to
allocate and administer the land. There is no need for the courts to be called on to
detennine who actually owns the land as long as this native title is not actually
threatened. This has largely been the actual practice in Namibia; although the state
claims title to the communal lands, it has generally deferred to the traditional authorities
to organize and distribute these lands according to customary law.
This customary law of communal land rights is, however, subordinate to
statutory law. There is no Roman Dutch "common law" of aboriginal title for an
obvious reason: Roman Dutch law was underdeveloped during the apartheid era.
While the British common law in the colonial settler societies of the United
States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand had to confront very complex issues of
aboriginal rights in the modem human rights era in a context which encouraged
liberal and creative judicial thinking, no such legal culture could exist in South
Africa and South West Africa. But this does not mean that Roman Dutch law,
properly applied, could not develop a parallel common law of indigenous land
rights appropriate for Namibia and South Africa. Indeed, the Canadian concept of"usufructuary rights" derives from Roman law.
All of this discussion of the nature of the legal title to the Himba lands needed
for the Epupa Dam, as complex as it is, may be nearly irrelevant in the struggle
against the dam. Under the Article 16 of the Namibian Constitution, the
Namibian state "may expropriate property in the public interest subject to the
payment of just compensation." There is no question that this provision applies to
the land needed for the Epupa Dam, whoever owns it. Thus, whether the state
needs to pay a trust, or Himba chiefs, or each Himba man, woman, and child, the
Epupa Dam can be built, under Namibian law, provided such "just compensa-
tion" is paid to the relevant "owners" of the property underlying the dam, the
reservoir, and other areas used in dam construction.
It has been suggested that this principle of eminent domain, based on the idea
that the state holds an underlying title to all the land under its sovereignty, may be
limited by basic principles of human rights.222 Thus, there is an argument that this
principle is not absolute, but must be weighed against other fundamental rights.
The basic right of a tribal people to exist and related indigenous rights are the
opposing rights, presenting a very difficult human rights issue, obviously without
precedent in Namibian courts.
221. John Bruce, A Perspective on Indigenous Land Tenure Systems and Land Concentration, in S.P. REYNA
AND R. E. DOWNS, LAND AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA (1994).
222. Marcus Colchester, Sharing Power: Dams, Indigenous Peoples and Ethnic Minorities, World Commis-
sion on Dams, Thematic Paper, March 2000, available at http://www.dams.org (last visited Aug. 10, 2001).
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Desert land in Namibia is inexpensive. Farms of 8,000 hectares can be bought
for a million Namibian dollars, with improvements (US$ 150,000). The 300- to
400-square kilometers of land under the dam, plus some other land needed for
roads, the village housing Epupa Dam employees, may well have a fair market
value of only a few million US dollars. Especially in comparison to the price of
the project, the actual value of the land is not what is really at issue.
That, precisely, is the reason why a simple assertion of Himba "ownership" of
their lands has not been their only argument against the dam. Their graves, their
culture, the future needs of their people and their herds, are their real values for
which they cannot be compensated. These rights involve their right to exist as a
people, a new generation of rights just beginning to be recognized in world
forums, and yet to be recognized in Africa.
VI. THE INTERNATIONAL CUSTOMARY LAW OF ABORIGINAL TITLE IN NAMIBIA
A newly emerging body of international law protecting indigenous rights has
potential impact in Namibia because Namibia's constitution explicitly incorpo-
rates international law into domestic law. While the National Assembly has the
power to legislate otherwise if it so desires, the Constitution generally recognizes
customary international law as part of the public law of Namibia. Indigenous
peoples enjoy various rights under international law, including a right to their
traditional lands, to maintain their cultures, and some measure of local sover-
eignty to protect those lands and cultures.223 Therefore, communal landholders in
Namibia have some form of recognizable land title.
These new developments in international law began with Convention 107 of
the International Labor Organization (ILO) of 1957, an organization predating,
but now affiliated with the United Nations. This convention both extended the
scope of "international law" to indigenous peoples living within member nations,
and required that member nations "shall have the primary responsibility for
developing coordinated and systematic action for the protection of the popula-
tions concerned. 224 Other rights followed in international law, including a broad
"right to self-determination" that not only refers to a right to sovereignty, but also
a more general right to self government and self-regulation of local affairs, as
well as the right to maintain indigenous cultures.225 While these measures are not
very developed in Africa, all potentially protect Himba interests at Epupa.
The simplest place to begin a discussion of Himba rights under international
law in the context of the Epupa Dam is with their land rights. The idea that a
modem nation-state can displace an indigenous people who have lived on the
223. See ANAYA, supra note 155, at 104-08.
224. Id. at 45 (quoting ILO Convention No. 107 of 1957, Article 2).
225. Id. at 75-112. Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, recognizes the right
of ethnic minorities to "enjoy their own culture." Id.
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same land for two hundred and fifty years without compensating them for their
lands belongs to another historical epoch.226 Indeed, the Government of Namibia,
while not admitting that the Himba have any land rights, has apparently conceded
that they would receive some compensation for their removal.227 This appears to
be a way for the Government to acknowledge Himba rights at Epupa while, at the
same time, avoiding recognition of indigenous land rights, which would have
consequences in other parts of Namibia. The government's compromise seems to
be to pay the Himba for "removal expenses" rather than compensating them for
their lands.
But the communal land rights of the Namibian peoples are too important to be
settled in this way. The Himba land rights are one particular set of land issues,
involving one remote corner of the country. There are at least a dozen peoples in
Namibia, each with a history of recognition of communal land rights by South
Africa. These land rights, in turn, are all based on unique historical circum-
stances. For some of the peoples, particularly north of the "police line" like the
Himba, Ovambo, Kavango, Fwe, their occupation of the land has been exclusive
and lengthy, extending back through colonial times. These represent the strongest
land rights claims in international law. The Damara, on the other hand, occupy
communal lands given them by South Africa as recently as the 1960s, purchased
from Afrikaner farmers, who were settled as late as the 1950s on lands tradition-
ally belonging to Damara, Nama, Herero, Bushmen, and other peoples.228 These
land rights issues are extremely complex, historically specific, and difficult to
resolve. Moreover, much of the land involved is in more settled, and therefore
valuable, parts of Namibia. The Herero, for example, claim much of the best farm
and ranch land in central Namibia.229
The argument for recognizing communal land rights under international law is
based on considerations of both law and equity, questions of simple fairness and
justice. While modern land law is based on the complex law of real property,
requiring recorded titles and deeds, there can be no question that people living in
societies without such devices also "own" their lands, and have a legal right to
land under whatever customary law governs those societies. This proposition
226. Id. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 17, provides that "no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his property." Id.
227. Christof Maletsky, Himba's Hour of Destiny Beckons, NAMIBIAN, Sept. 26, 1997, at I (reporting that
Minister of Mines and Energy Toivo ya Toivo told Parliament that he did not have a precise estimate of Himba
compensation figures, but indicated that the combined costs of damage to the ecosystem, removing graves, and
resettling the Himba was US$ 8.9 million for the Epupa site and US$ 6.7 for the Baynes site). Not only is the
grouping of "damage to the ecosystem" with "relocating the Himba" difficult to understand, but the estimate
seems impossibly low.
228. Sian Sullivan, SSD Research Report: The Communalization of Former Commercial Farmland:
Perspectives from Damaraland and Implications for Land Reform, University of Namibia, Multidisciplinary
Research Centre, Jan. 1996 (on file with author).
229. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Its Past on Its Sleeve, Tribe Seeks Bonn's Apology, N.Y. TIMES, May 31, 1998,
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extends well back in the English common law and, indeed, was even recognized
by the colonial German authorities that used various kinds of legal devices such
as treaties and individual sales to gain title to Namibian land. Since no authority
ever exercised any permanent dominion over Himba lands inconsistent with their
rights, their basic land rights remain.
Modem international law, with the rise of the "new" United Nations and its
increased third world membership, has moved away from the euro-centric
conceptualization of various rights to look more broadly at the actual shape of
rights, including land rights, in the modem world. 230 The idea that indigenous
peoples can be arbitrarily and even violently displaced from their lands, without
compensation or any acknowledgment of ownership rights at all, is derived from
the logic of colonialism, the same ideology that gave rise to the European "race"
to seize the lands of the various peoples of Africa, Asia, and America. This is no
longer consistent with international common law.
This has already been well-stated above. For example, the Himba could be
lavishly compensated for "removal" expenses and the disruption of their lives,
without being compensated for their land. Or they could be compensated for their
land "in kind," with new grants of lands and new villages. Virtually all of the
large dam construction schemes in the world have involved some "relocation"
programs, most of which have left native people living in remote slums, with
economies destroyed, and cultures irreparably damaged.231 These payments do
not represent legal payments for indigenous lands and the likely destruction of
culture. Rather, they are simply removal expenses, paid to move indigenous
people out of the way.
The problem with this proposition is that Himba interests cannot be compen-
sated with money, and international law requires more than just an acknowledg-
ment of their traditional land rights. The payment of money damages, whether for
land, moving expenses, relocation villages, is the "cheap" solution, adding a few
million dollars to the cost of a US$ 1 billion dam.232 The inevitable result will be
social decay, impoverishment, and the loss of a distinct Himba culture. The
traditional calculus of dam building as been to justify this as "regrettable but
inevitable," an unfortunate cost of development. 233 A few people, often small and
weak people are injured, but for the greater good.
This discourse, while it can be cast in legal terms under broad principles of
230. Colchester, supra note 222.
231. Leopoldo Jose Bartolome et al., Displacement, Resettlement, Rehabilitation, Reparation and Develop-
ment, World Commission on Dams, Thematic Review 1.3, March 2000, available at http://www.dams.org (last
visited Aug. 10, 2001).
232. The actual preliminary figures put forward put the cost of more than 380 square kilometers of land,
relocation of 600 to 1,000 Himba and their cattle, relocation of graves, and the cost of "damage to the
ecosystem" combined at about US$ 10 million - about 1% of the cost of a billion dollar dam. Christoff
Maletsky, Himba Hour of Destiny Beckons, NAMIBIAN, Sept. 26, 1997, at 1.
233. Dams and Development Report, supra note 62, at 97-112.
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indigenous rights in international law, is primarily political, ultimately a decision
for the Namibian government, with a broad mandate to respect the needs of all
the countries peoples. Existing arguments about the marginal economic potential
of the Epupa Dam enter into this calculation. Obviously, for some, while
displacing the Himba for a much needed dam might be justified, displacing them
for a marginal project does not make sense. Indeed, most of this argument relies
on the position that the Epupa Dam doesn't make sense on purely economic
grounds, with or without Himba removal. Thus, the rights of the Himba become a
"cost" to be taken account of in the decision to build the dam, right alongside all
other costs.
But any question of Himba communal land rights in Namibia under intema-
tional law is, under Article 144 of the Constitution, subject to extinguishment by
a simple act of the National Assembly that would override any rule of interna-
tional law. This makes these complex human rights-rights to land, culture, and
self-determination--essentially political questions, subject to the will of Parlia-
ment, completely in the hands of the SWAPO majority.
There is no small irony in the fact that Namibia, as a nation, is a product of
international law, more than any other nation in the world. The dispute in
international law over the original League of Nations' Mandate and its systemic
and brutal violation by South Africa took seventy years to revolve, including
repeated actions by the World Court and the General Assembly of the United
Nations. International law ultimately prevailed as the U.N. finally presided over
Namibia's independence and the withdrawal of South African authorities.2 34
Namibia, in turn, created a constitution featuring the most extensive bill of rights
in Africa and recognition of international law. 235 None of this has yet to offer the
Himba any legal support, although, obviously, it has created a framework for
articulating their rights in the context of opposing the Epupa Dam.
VII. EVOLVING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS
PEOPLES DISPLACED BY THE CONSTRUCTION OF LARGE DAMS
Since the middle of the 1990s, some clear international standards on the rights
of indigenous peoples displaced by large dam projects have emerged. These
standards do not fundamentally depend on a "land rights" approach to indigenous
peoples living in these regions. Rather, issues of "land title" are irrelevant; the
underlying issue is that of the negative social impacts of removal-such as
unemployment, poverty, disease, disruption of communities, and cultural despo-
liation - impact disproportionately on the the displaced peoples. While issues of
aboriginal title are extremely complex, testing the capacity of modern courts and
polities, arguments about social mitigation programs are much more directly
234. See JOHN DUGARD, THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/NAMIBIA DIsPuTE (1973).
235. NALDI, supra note 210.
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based on the law of equity; no government should do harm to poor peoples in
order to advance particular schemes of national development. And, in the event
such schemes are justified, basic principles of equity require that the social costs
be fairly born by all, so that those benefiting from the large dams should pay
proportionate relocation costs. 2 3 6
In an era when exaggerated claims under international law are not uncommon,
it has to be clearly stated that these new standards cannot yet be said to have
become part of the corpus of international customary law. Therefore, it has to be
clear that there is no argument that Namibia is currently bound by these
standards. At this level it is a political question, and these organizations have
great experience at these kinds of political matters. The argument is that Namibia
should be bound by these standards because they are equitable.
These standards have emerged as both ethical standards for dam builders as
well as standards for banks and other funders of dam projects. The World Bank
and the World Commission on Dams, both international organizations, are the
two organizations instrumental in setting out these standards. The World Bank,
which is not involved in funding the Epupa project, has a long and dismal history
of financing large scale development projects in the Third World that are modeled
on western conceptions of development, run up huge debt, and do great damage
to indigenous peoples and the environment. Some of this experience underlies the
World Bank's decision, in a series of related directives, to set out standards for
large-scale development projects that involve forced removals of local peoples.
Without going into unnecessary detail, the essence of the World Bank
standards requires both careful and systematic study of the impact of large
dams on local populations, as well as additional standards requiring that
forced removals not occur unless the displaced peoples can be relocated
without loss of their culture in a position where they are at least as well off
economically as they were before relocation. 7 This standard is essentially
unmet in modem large dam construction. It was the failure of the Government
of India to provide this level of support that led the World Bank to abandon
funding the now infamous Narmada River project in India.238 If this standard
is adhered to it could mean the end of World Bank funding for large dam
projects. Given the influence of the World Bank in western banking and
236. See Dams and Development, supra note 62.
237. POWER CONFLICTS, supra note 90, atch. 5. Operational Directive OD 4.01 (1991) requires environmen-
tal impact assessments to "improve decision making process and ensure that the project options under
consideration are environmentally sound and sustainable .... The Bank expects the borrower to take the views
of affected groups and local NGOS fully into account in project design and implementation." OD 4.20 (1991)
requires special sensitivity to indigenous peoples, and OD 4.30 (1990) sets standards for forced resettlement. Id.
238. Id. The Indian Government has been determined to finish the project on its own resources, a position
supported by the Indian Supreme Court. Narmada Bachao Andolan v. Union of India and Others, Supreme
Court of India, Writ Petition (c) No. 319 of 1994, delivered Oct. 18, 2000. A history of the project is found in
SANJAY SANGVAI, THE RIVER AND LIFE: STORY OF THE NARMADA BACHAO ANDOLAN (2000).
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foreign aid circles, it is likely that this standard will be widely applied as an
ethical standard by western funding sources.
However, at the same time, this also represents a "legal" standard, relying
extensively on modem views of the legal rights of indigenous peoples to their
lands and their cultures. These issues now have been the subject of various
United Nations enactments, beginning with International Labor Organization
(ILO) Convention, which states that "indigenous peoples shall participate in the
formulation, implementation and evaluation of plans and programmes for na-
tional and regional development which may affect them directly., 239 Similarly, in
1993, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution
condemning forced evictions as "a gross violation of human rights. ' 240 In this
sense, the World Bank, using the advice of its own lawyers, applied an evolving
customary international law to its own operations.
The World Commission on Dams is an independent commission, made up of
experts and jurists from all over the world, which undertook the first global study
of the impact of large dams on the development process. After three years of
investigation, involving reports of over three hundred dam projects,2 4 1 it issued a
report in November 2000, calling for new standards to be applied in approving
large dam projects. Among these was a requirement that local populations both be
consulting and also that the impact of the dam project on local peoples be
considered as part of the cost of the project in evaluating overall feasibility.24
2
Their findings in some ways paralleled those of the World Bank, but
recommended a higher standard of protection of indigenous rights.243 In a
careful survey of each project, it was clear that the displaced local popula-
tions bore significant human costs that were rarely considered in evaluating
the costs of dam projects. The "feasibility study" process itself was found
biased in favor of engineering and economic issues such as if the dam could
be built and paid for. Yet, the cost of making permanent refugees of millions
239. International Labor Organization, Convention 169, 1989, at www.ilo.org.
240. See http://www.un.org (last visited Aug. 10, 2001).
241. These three hundred reports include one on Epupa by Andrew Corbett, Director of the Legal Assistance
Centre, who represented the Himba in the feasibility study process. "The Epupa Dam Question: Its Impact on
the Local Himba Community and the Natural Environment," paper submitted to the World Commission on
Dams, 1998.
242. World Commission on Dams, Dams and Development: A New Framework for Decision-Making: The
Report of the World Commission Dams, (2000), available at http://www.dams.org.
243. While the World Bank's initial standards for dam construction were influential in the World Commis-
sion on Dams work, the World Bank has since, in February 2001, announced "that it would not adopt the WCD's
recommendations and guidelines "if taken as a checklist of requirements to be complied with and conformed to"
but would use them as "non binding reference when considering new dams." Peter Bosshard, NGOs Protest
World Bank Position on WCD Guidelines for Dams, WORLD RIVERS REVIEW, April 2001, 15. Obviously,
reconciling these two positions is both complex and political. While the World Bank does not inherently object
to any of the particular recommendations or guidelines of the WCD report, it refuses to read them as "standards"
that must be universally met before a dam can be constructed. Thus, the "standards" themselves are still
recognized in customary international law but in a flexible way.
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of people, and their children, often for generations, is staggering, fundamen-
tally changing any rational calculation of the "costs" of building and
operating a dam. Again, the work of the World Commission on Dams was
strongly influenced by evolving international human rights norms on the
rights of indigenous peoples. Therefore, their conclusions, like those of the
World Bank, are "legal" conclusions, important in setting out current stan-
dards of customary international law relating to the rights of indigenous
peoples living in the way of large dam projects.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Himba base their opposite to the Epupa dam on a wide range of issues, but
the core of their position is that the land is "theirs" and they have a legal right to
live there. These legal rights are not statutory, but are developed through a
complex set of arguments about the nature of communal land rights in colonial
Namibia, apartheid-era Namibia, and now under the independent Namibian state.
The law is about process as much as it is about result. It is a common theme of
environmental controversies that they are never "finished" because any decision
stopping development can be reversed in future years. Nothing about the Epupa
Power Scheme has been resolved; nothing is "finished." This Article is not a story
about how one tribal people "defeated" a large dam; the Government of Namibia
might announce plans to build the dam tomorrow. In fact, one scenario in
Namibia is that the project is "shelved" for twenty years or so, both because there
is sufficient power for the present, and also to let the current controversy die to
await a more favorable time, both in relation to the Himba protest and to the
continuing war in Angola.
The Epupa Dam is the product of German colonial era planning, dating back to
at least 1904. This span of almost a hundred years reminds us that a river can
always be dammed, because it will be there for another hundred years and there is
always increased development pressure. While a powerful assertion of Himba
rights, coupled with a continued civil war and world economic stagnation, has
apparently put the Epupa Dam on hold at the turn of the twenty-first century, the
fact that this scheme has already gone through a hundred years of planning
testifies to its potential.
A set of economic and human rights concerns about dam building generally, as
exemplified in the World Commission of Dams Report, arose at an opportune
time in the Epupa debate. A new sensitivity to calculating the "real" costs of the
dam, rather than just the value of electric power, makes the costs of what
previously might have been a marginal project, appear prohibitive through this
new economic calculus. Adding cost overruns, the cost of removing the Himba
and of violating their human rights, land and relocation costs, ecological costs,
the hidden costs of water consumption, the costs of removing the dam when it is
obsolete in perhaps forty years make what might have initially appeared to be a
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"marginal" project a hopelessly wasteful one- another third world planning
disaster.
These economic concerns stagnated plans for the Epupa Dam and made the
dam impossible to build from a financial standpoint, but the old colonial
imposition of South African dams on Angolan soil also resurfaced. Despite the
discussion of a Permanent Joint Technical Commission, there was almost no
"joint" in the project because almost all of the electricity was for Namibia.
Angola would get a few jobs, the construction village, some roads, but little more
after the construction was finished. Although the Kunene River is largely an
Angolan river, its water and power would disproportionately go to Namibia.
Potential increased use of the Kunene within Angola for agriculture and power
will reduce the flow of water to Epupa and reduce the power capacity of the dam.
A Portuguese concession to South Africa in the 1920s, completely disregarding
the needs of an independent Angola, created the situation where Angola yielded
its water rights to Namibia. Angola's insistence on the Baynes site could
potentially keep more of the water in Angola, but it is still only a fraction of the
use Angola could derive from the Kunene River. Namibia and Angola are,
however, longstanding allies with a good relationship, and this political differ-
ence could be negotiated.
Similarly, it must be obvious that the continuing war in Angola overshadows
all other border issues in both Namibia and Angola. While the immediate area of
the Epupa Dam is safe and removed from any fighting since the 1980s, the upper
Kunene River is in the center of the Angolan Civil War. No foreign investment is
likely in a war zone. Angola, itself, cannot engage in the kind of strategic
planning that Namibia has in relationship to its use of electrical energy. There-
fore, it is not clear that the Epupa power scheme in its present form is in the
interests of a post-civil war Angola. The answer to that question presupposes a
rational and careful Angolan planning process, which is contingent on peace and
an end to the famine that haunts that land.
Angola, whenever the war ends, will be in great need of development and
reconstruction. The Kunene River is central to the planning of agricultural
development in south central Angola, a rich agricultural region that has been
devastated by war. Angola does not need the approval of Namibia for internal
development, but any extensive Angolan use of the Kunene River above the
Epupa Falls will affect the dam's operation.
The Himba still claim that they own the land needed for the proposed Epupa
and Baynes Dams. Their land claims have never been litigated because the
Namibian government has always left them undisturbed on their traditional
lands. The government's indecision on going forward with the Epupa Dam has
left the Himba people in a state of uncertainty. Yet the broad legal issues raised by
the Himba, particularly their land rights, cast a large shadow over Namibian
development. The land rights of the half of Namibia's population that live in the
communal lands are uncertain; and these people may be subject to forced
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removal at any time, for any political reason. The Himba land at Epupa is
distinguished only by the immediate importance and massive size of the power
project.
Yet, by asserting their rights against the Namibian government, the Himba and
their Herero relatives opened up a discourse of indigenous rights in Namibia,
challenging the right of the government to their lands, and forcing the govern-
ment to begrudgingly acknowledge some Himba rights. The Government of
Namibia did not rise to the challenge and instead engaged in an unprincipled
campaign to malign Himba people, accusing them of being "dupes" of foreign
environmental activists and "backward" and primitive tribal people who were
selfishly and ignorantly blocking a needed development project. These charges
mimicked the paternalism that colonial authorities always exercised on behalf of
the African peoples, a paternalism based on assumptions that indigenous peoples
lacked the intelligence to understand their own interests. The government's
assertion that the Himba have an "equal" "right to development" under the
Constitution of Namibia that can be forced on them defies both legal reasoning
and common sense and fails to acknowledge the validity of Himba rights within
the broader development process. The reaction of the Himba to the Epupa Dam
has to be seen as a reflection of their basic right to control their own destinies, in
their own lands. The Himba struggle against the Epupa Dam represents basic
democracy moving forward in one corner of Africa, a discourse on development
that includes the impacted tribal peoples as well as government functionaries.
The role of lawyers in these events is significant. There is no question that the
Legal Assistance Centre's representation of the Himba has been important both in
supporting the Himba, and in demonstrating to the Namibian government that it
could not simply ignore issues of Himba rights as the dam planning process
moved forward. Although the Government accused the Himba of being "dupes"
of their lawyers and the international environmental movement, the position the
lawyers have represented has actually been that of the Himba's.
Similarly, the international and Namibian environmental movements, includ-
ing the International Rivers Network and Survival International, played impor-
tant roles in publicizing the Himba struggle against the Epupa Dam, but all
became involved well after Himba opposition was well advanced within Namibia
by the Himba themselves. The importance of international pressure on Namibia
is difficult to measure, although the government, defending Namibian national-
ism, vigorously denies any impact. This environmental discourse was advanced
within Namibia, by the active political reporting of the NAMIBIAN, which took an
early interest in the Epupa project, and set a model of careful environmental
reporting, analyzing the meaning of "development" in all its complexity.
While the language of law has apparently served the Himba well to date, it is
not clear that the Namibian legal system is the appropriate venue to protect
Himba rights, even though the Namibian judiciary has played an important and
independent role in Namibian development. It is a conservative and politically
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cautious judiciary, subject to occasional attacks from the government and
therefore exceedingly careful in the judgments that it hands down. It seems quite
likely that the judiciary is prepared to defer to the government on matters of
public policy, including issues relating to the ownership and disposition of the
communal lands.
There is a final irony here, that it is the Himba who may have "gotten it right"
in this complex situation. How a well-financed feasibility study could go so
wrong is a classic study of the experts turning over on themselves, an arrogance
of power corrupting the underlying science of dam building. The US$ 5 million
feasibility study could not measure the actual flow of a small river, made
economic calculations that left out some of the key variables, financed an
inadequate social study, and simply forgot to formulate a required "social
mitigation program." These mistakes are not accidents but the actions of
technical experts who were single-mindedly focused on the technological end of
building the dam. The study was approached as a basic "third-world" kind of
study that would never be seriously challenged. The Himba asked the important
questions, the basic "what are you doing here on our land?" that led to the
answers that unraveled the whole project.
This observation is consistent with the call of the World Commission on Dams
for new ways of thinking about hydropower projects, a calculus that takes some
account of both the rights of indigenous peoples and also their viewpoints on
development, as well as rethinks the way that "costs" are calculated. While the
Himba were cast as "backward" and "obstructing national development," it
cannot be accepted that a "development" that puts Namibia a billion dollars or
more in debt in return for thirty years of electric power is in the national interest.
Rather, the whole process of thinking about "development" has to involve more
variables, evaluated in a more balanced way. Here, precisely, is where tribal
peoples and their values have much to say about "development."
At the same time, it is questionable whether the various environmental laws of
Namibia are inadequate to regulate a project as vast and complex as the Epupa
hydropower scheme. Even as simple a matter as carefully studying the ecological
consequences of the dam project and weighing those costs against the gains of
development may well be beyond the scope of Namibian lawmakers. Once the
question of the Himba and their land and cultural rights is added to this
complexity, Namibian legal process is even more taxed. This is not an indictment
of the Namibian legal system. Rather, it is inherent in the regulation of highly
complex third world environmental issues. Such networks of environmental laws
and enforcement regimes cannot be built overnight with few resources.
'This is not the place to speculate about all the possibilities. It is obvious that
plentiful and cheap electric power is important in development, one variable
among many that must be carefully weighed. But this power would not stay in
Namibia's under-developed and poor north. Rather, it would be used in mines and
farms, and to power an already fully electrified and sprawling Windhoek, a
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modem city with a white core, surrounded by miles and miles of shantytowns,
built by black people from the north hoping for work. More and cheaper
electricity is not a critical question in discussing the future shape of Windhoek as
an African capital city: the critical questions are where and how can people live?
How can they earn a living? How can racial equality be achieved after sixty years
of South African colonial rule? And how can Namibia achieve a meaningful and
democratic culture?
The Himba are not living in urban slums, but in traditional villages; they are
not standing by the roadside in mining towns attempting to get jobs as day
laborers, but are fully employed as herders. If anything is known about the
prospects of African development, it must be that there are no prospects for an
Africa that look like Europe. Africa must be different, and it must be developed
differently. The exact process is still developing, is unknown, and is likely to be
complex, but must be determined by Africans. Above all, it has to be obvious that
the Himba have some role to play in this process; that they have something
important to say about development in Africa.
This comes full circle to the Himba, the Epupa Dam, and the discourse of
development in Kaokoland. The "real" Africa must be a place where "real"
African people can live with their basic needs secure. There is no model,
anywhere in the world, of what a major hydroelectric project at Epupa might look
like that actually met those needs. The best image we have is one that physically
resembles a cross between the Kariba Dam on the Zambezi River between
Zimbabwe and Zambia, lined with docks, houseboats, and eco-tourist resorts, and
the Glen Canyon Dam, the large desert dam on the Colorado River, flooding
hundreds of miles of canyon lands, that more closely resembles Epupa visually,
although both without the vast mud flat that will characterize Epupa for most of
the year. Somehow, neither of those models stands as much of a prospect for the
majority of Africa.
The 57,000 Tonga people displaced by the Kariba Dam are still suffering from
their forced relocation forty years ago.244 It is not clear that the cheap electricity
that the Kariba Dam generates helps to alleviate the modem economic problems
of Zambia or Zimbabwe, but cheap electricity is obviously of some economic
benefit. Both economies, despite of this cheap electricity, are in ruins, both
democracies are fragile; both populations suffer from poverty and disease
generations after independence. And, in neither country, do the masses of black
people enjoy the simple luxury of electric light in their homes. 45
There is now the chance to pause and think about what this all means. Namibia,
because of South African occupation, was not developing in the 1960s, 1970s,
and 1980s, and does not have to be saddled with the debt, instability, and legacy
244. World Commission on Dams, Kariba Dam Case Study, final draft, September 2000, 24-47, available at
http://www.dams.org.
245. Id.
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of bad development decisions made by most Third World nations of that era. The
Epupa Dam offers one small and very expensive path toward one image of
development. It cannot be clearly said that it is worth the price.
This leaves the OvaHimba, still mostly naked, not yet clad in suits and ties like
the various government functionaries who are trying to move forward with the
Epupa Dam project, and still herding tens of thousands of cattle in Kaokoland. It
is impossible to put a value on their culture. While anthropologists can remind us
that their life style is not "traditional" in that it has evolved and "modernized"
throughout the twentieth century, it is still a unique pastoral culture, a window
back to another era in Namibian and African history. It is impossible to say how
long their society can last. It is fragile, and under a great deal of political and
economic pressure.
The Namibian government, faced with demands for "land reform," could end
Himba society as it exists today just by moving thousands of Ovambo, Herero, or
Damara and their cattle into the vast lands of Kaokoland and removing the Himba
to a small corner of their present lands. Even if the Epupa Dam is not built,
massive and uncontrolled tourist development at the Epupa Falls could bring
more outsiders than the village that would house the dam workers. Another
drought could kill most of the Himba cattle, and the government could use this
opportunity to remove the tribe from their lands. The Himba lead a precarious
life-style, facing great environmental and political threats, with or without the
Epupa Dam.
But it is "their" culture; it belongs to the Himba and all they ask at the
present is that they be left alone on their lands. Whatever the future
development models for Africa, one model must include strengthening and
supporting the people as they make a living off their traditional lands. The
other model, the model of planned and reasonable development, must not be
seen as inherently in opposition. Rather, it must take full account of the needs
of all the peoples of Namibia, as opposed to one expensive and wasteful
model of electric power generation. The World Commission on Dams Report
suggests new standards for the evaluation of complex, large-scale third world
hydroelectric projects such as Epupa.
It seems doubtful that the Epupa project can be justified under this model.
Indeed, it seems difficult to justify the Epupa project under any model, even
without considering the Himba refusal to permit the dam in their country. It is the
kind project that harkens back to another era of dam building, more common in
the 1950s, a billion dollar neo-colonial disaster that is destructive of a unique
eco-system and its traditional people, and that saddles Namibian taxpayers with
debt that can never be repaid for electricity that isn't needed. The entire
half-million Ovambo population could be provided electricity from the existing
Ruacana Dam, if it could be operated at 100% capacity, with a surplus to support
Namibia's power supply.
It is testimony to the strength of colonial-era development models that the
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project has come this close to fruition. The specter of building the Epupa Dam
over the bodies of the Himba is a powerful image, as is the governments' threat to
"neutralize" the Himba if they resist the dam,246 both images hopefully remain-
ing metaphoric, but invites a critical rethinking of the Kunene hydropower
scheme, the rights of indigenous peoples living in the path of large dams, the
development of Kaokoland and northern Namibia in general, and of the future of
dam building in Africa.
246. Jesaya Nyamu, the current Minister of Mines and Energy made this threat in an interview published in
Scientific American in June 2001, clearly not the kind of image the Namibian government wants to project to the
world. "We know them. They cannot do anything. If they try anything, we will neutralize them, of course. But I
do not think it will come to that." Ezzell, supra note 4.
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